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1657 
The “Ample Alternative Channels” 
Flaw in First Amendment Doctrine 
Enrique Armijo 
Abstract 
In reviewing a content-neutral regulation affecting speech, 
courts ask if the regulation leaves open “ample alternative channels 
of communication” for the restricted speaker’s expression. 
Substitutability is the underlying rationale. If the message could 
have been expressed in some other legal way, the ample alternative 
channels requirement is met. The court then deems the restriction’s 
harm to the speaker’s expressive right as de minimis and upholds 
the law. For decades, courts and free speech scholars have assumed 
the validity of this principle. It has set First Amendment 
jurisprudence on the wrong course.  
Permitting a speech restriction because the speaker could have 
communicated the same message another way distorts the First 
Amendment. Ample alternative channels analysis instructs courts 
to engage in counterfactual, post-hoc reasoning as to the expressive 
choices the speaker could have made, but didn’t—i.e., to substitute 
the court’s own value judgments for those of the speaker’s. The 
modern communications world expands the doctrine’s pernicious 
effects, since speech-facilitating technologies can always 
theoretically grant an alternative means of expression to any 
infringed speaker. And the origin of the doctrine, from Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence in United States v. O’Brien, shows that 
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ample alternative channels analysis was in its incipiency a 
misguided afterthought—born, as historical Supreme Court case 
files never examined before this Article show, as literally a margin 
note to an unpublished draft.  
In the place of ample alternative channels analysis, courts 
should ask whether a speaker’s chosen mode is incompatible with 
the government’s interest in the restriction in question. An 
incompatibility rule would be more consistent with the Roberts 
Court’s turn toward reviewing content-neutral speech restrictions 
rigorously, as evidenced in 2014’s McCullen v. Coakley.  
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I. Introduction 
You are a Hare Krishna. As part of your spiritual obligation, 
you must engage in Sankirtan, which requires, in addition to 
public singing and chanting of mantras, the hand-to-hand 
dissemination of religious literature and face-to-face solicitation of 
donations for the church.1 These interactions between devotees 
and potential recruits in public spaces are critical to the growth of 
your chosen faith.2 
Your community’s largest public gathering of the year, and 
thus your best opportunity to proselytize to thousands of potential 
new recruits to Krishna Consciousness, is the state fair.3 But the 
fair’s vendor solicitation rules require you, or any other person or 
organization seeking to distribute materials to fairgoers, to do so 
only from behind a booth that is assigned to a fixed location within 
the fairgrounds chosen by the fair’s organizers. 
Note what the fair’s requirements do not bar you from doing. 
They do not ban you from the fairgrounds altogether, and it 
permits you to interact with fellow fairgoers who approach your 
                                                                                                     
 1. See E. Burke Rochford Jr., Recruitment Strategies, Ideology, and 
Organization in the Hare Krishna Movement, 29 SOCIAL PROBS. 399, 401 (1982) 
(noting that encounters in public places are an important way of recruiting new 
members to the growth of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness); 
see also ISKCON of Potomac, Inc. v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 949, 952–53 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) (describing a “Krishnafest” held by the International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness of the Potomac). 
 2. See Rochford, supra note 1, at 401–02; (“Table 1 shows [that] 42 percent 
[of ISKCON devotees] made contact in public places.”); see also E. Burke Rochford, 
Jr., A Study of Recruitment and Transformation Processes in the Hare Krishna 
Movement 19–20 (Apr. 1, 1982) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
California, Los Angeles) (observing that, unlike other new religious movements, 
in which preexisting “social network ties have played a prominent role in the[ir] 
expansion . . . persons recruited into Krishna Consciousness most often made 
their initial contact with the movement in public place encounters with Krishna 
devotees.”) (on file with the author).  
 3. These facts are taken from Heffron v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna 
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981).  
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assigned booth. You challenge the fair’s requirements on First 
Amendment grounds. Should you prevail? 
Now consider a second hypothetical. You own a piece of real 
estate that you wish to sell.4 To attract interest in the property 
from prospective buyers, you want to post a “For Sale” sign in the 
home’s front lawn. However, your town bars owners from placing 
sales-related signage on the lawns of their homes. Once again, note 
what the restriction does not bar you doing: you may list your 
property for sale with agents; you may place informational flyers 
in a dedicated box on the lawn that passersby can help themselves 
to (so long as the box is labeled “Free Information,” and not “For 
Sale”); you may place your sign in the home’s windows (though 
again, not the yard); craigslist, realtor.com, and the rest of the 
Internet are available to you; and you retain the ability to show the 
home to prospective buyers at times of mutual convenience.  
You challenge the township’s signage ban on First 
Amendment grounds. Should the aforementioned facts be 
relevant? In other words, should the ban survive your challenge 
because you are able communicate that the home is on the market 
by other means despite the township’s restriction—even though 
you, the restricted speaker, favor using a “For Sale” sign over any 
of those means? 
Alternatively, assume instead that the sign you wish to place 
in your lawn expresses your opposition to the Iraq War.5 This time, 
your township bars all yard signs except for “For Sale” signs.6 Is 
the town’s abridgement of your speech cured by your ability to 
express your distaste for the War through a range of other 
constitutionally protected manners of expression, from picketing 
and handing out antiwar flyers on your front lawn to placing 
bumper stickers all over your car (parked right outside your 
house)—expression that the township’s signage ban does not 
implicate in any way?  
These three hypotheticals, all based on actual cases, involve 
different kinds of speech—religious; commercial; political. The 
                                                                                                     
 4. These facts are taken from Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 
85, 98 (1977).  
 5. These facts are taken from City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58–59 
(1994). 
 6. Id. at 45. 
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government interests underlying the regulations abridging that 
speech vary widely as well—patron enjoyment of the state fair; 
preventing white flight; aesthetic choices regarding visual clutter.7 
But in all three cases, in deciding whether the restriction in 
question abridged the speaker’s First Amendment right, the U.S. 
Supreme Court considered the relative effectiveness of alternative 
modes of expression that the speaker did not use—and, for all we 
or the Court know, that the speaker may in fact have chosen not to 
have used.  
Current First Amendment doctrine finds that if ample 
alternative channels of expression exist for a speaker to express 
her views, then a content-neutral regulation foreclosing the 
speaker’s chosen channel of expression will survive review.8 This 
Article’s fundamental premise is that such a finding is at odds with 
the First Amendment itself.  
Giving the availability of alternative communication channels 
dispositive significance in speech cases undermines speakers’ 
communicative choices with respect to their speech’s audience, 
effectiveness, and reach—choices that both self-autonomy and 
marketplace theory teach deserve constitutional respect.9 The 
doctrine calls on judges to substitute their First Amendment 
values for the restricted speaker’s; to engage in counterfactual, 
post-hoc reasoning as to the choices the speaker could have made, 
but did not; and to focus on such hypotheticals at the expense of 
the relevant inquiry: whether the state has adequately justified its 
                                                                                                     
 7. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 656–57 (justifying the state fair’s rule in the 
interest of maintaining orderly movement of individuals at the fair); Linmark 
Assocs., Inc., 431 U.S. at 94 (“[T]he vital goal this ordinance serves [is] namely, 
promoting stable, racially integrated housing.”); Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 49 (“Ladue 
relies squarely on that [esthetic values] content-neutral justification for its 
ordinance.”). 
 8. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 726 (2000) (“[W]hen a content-neutral 
regulation does not entirely foreclose any means of communication, it may satisfy 
the tailoring requirement even though it is not the least restrictive or least 
intrusive means of serving the statutory goal.”). 
 9. See id. at 751 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the “right to be let 
alone” contemplated by Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States is the right 
of a speaker in a public forum to be free from governmental intrusion). 
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interference with speech.10 This approach leads to speech-averse 
results in a range of cases.11 It is also a constitutional anomaly.  
In no other area of constitutional law do courts excuse 
government interferences with protected rights on the grounds 
that despite the interference at issue, the affected party could have 
exercised that same right as effectively in a different way. For 
example, when a college student is denied admission to their public 
university of choice on account of their race, no court asks whether 
the student could have been admitted to another comparable 
school (let alone whether the student did in fact apply and was 
admitted to such a school), and if so, whether that fact minimizes 
the harm caused by violating the student’s right to equal 
protection.12 A city could not successfully defend a ban on firing 
ranges against a Second Amendment challenge on the ground that 
ranges are available in a jurisdiction nearby.13 And after last 
term’s Obergefell v. Hodges,14 which held that the right to same-
sex marriage is fundamental, 15 no state could save its ban on such 
marriages by arguing that it permits same-sex civil unions, which 
                                                                                                     
 10. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
46, 50 (1987) (“The Court does not seriously inquire into the substantiality of the 
governmental interest, and it does not seriously examine the alternative means 
by which the government could achieve its objectives. As a result, when the Court 
applies this standard, it invariably upholds the challenged restriction.”). 
 11. Infra Part II.B.1. 
 12. These facts may at most raise a standing question, but even that issue is 
far from clear. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 758 F.3d 633, 662 (5th Cir. 2014), 
aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207 (2016) (arguing that nonadmitted student lacked 
standing to challenge constitutionality of public university admissions decision 
because the student had been admitted and subsequently graduated from another 
school). 
Moreover, the Court has expressly rejected the argument that a state can 
cure a race-based denial of a student’s university admission by providing a 
substitute as an alternative. See Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 
351–52 (1938) (finding that attendance at a university of any adjacent state for 
law school is not a valid alternative for attendance at in-state institution that will 
not accept black students). 
 13. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 697, 709–10 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(finding that Chicago had not established a strong enough public-interest 
rationale for its ban on firing ranges and thus this plan likely violated the 
plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights). 
 14. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 15. See id. at 2607 (“The Court, in this decision, holds same-sex couples may 
exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States.”). 
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provide all of the benefits of marital status under that state’s 
substantive law, and thus the ban does not offend due process.16  
The closest analogy is to free exercise claims. Post-
Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith,17 courts apply much less 
searching review to laws of general applicability that incidentally 
burden religious exercise.18 However, even post-Smith, if a 
generally applicable law burdens a specific religious practice, a 
court does not—indeed, could not—find as a basis for supporting 
the law that the burdened party can exercise their religion just as 
avidly despite the burden, due to a different but legally available 
means for the same expression. In Smith itself, the majority did 
not conclude—and in fact expressly declined to conclude—that 
Native Americans could engage in their religious rituals without 
peyote.19. But this is what happens in every First Amendment case 
                                                                                                     
 16. This was true pre-Obergefell as well. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. 
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 414–17 (Conn. 2008) (rejecting the argument that the 
state’s refusal to marry same-sex couples did not violate due process because civil 
unions in the state entitled “gay persons . . . to all of the rights that married 
couples enjoy”).  
 17. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 18. See id. at 892 (“[T]he Court holds that where the law is a generally 
applicable criminal prohibition, our usual free exercise jurisprudence does not 
even apply. . . .). 
 19. See id. at 887  
Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that 
courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief 
in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim . . . . It is not within 
the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or 
practices to a faith . . . . 
(quoting Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989))).  
The Court’s undue burden analysis in its abortion jurisprudence might be 
analogous. A law closing every abortion clinic in a given area might not violate a 
woman’s right (from that area) to terminate a pre-viability pregnancy if the 
woman can obtain an abortion in some other less convenient, though still 
available, locality. See, e.g., Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 
2292, 2313 (2015) (“We recognize that increased driving distances do not always 
constitute an ‘undue burden.’”). But the undue burden test is about determining 
whether inconvenience has crossed into impermissible interference with the right 
the test protects. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 920 (1992) (“A state-imposed burden on the exercise of a 
constitutional right is measured both by its effects and by its character: A burden 
may be ‘undue’ either because the burden is too severe or because it lacks a 
legitimate, rational justification.”). In those First Amendment cases where a 
choice as to mode, time, or place for speech is itself expressive, the alternative 
saving the regulation’s constitutionality (as discussed infra notes 26, 39–41) is 
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involving a content-neutral law; such restrictions are upheld so 
long as the reviewing court deems that the speaker could have 
expressed the speech in question through a different mode.20 And 
most importantly, this is so irrespective of the speaker’s 
assessment of the equality of the substitute.21 This is the 
equivalent of arguing that a state’s blanket ban on peyote does not 
offend the free exercise rights of Native Americans because they 
remain free to use sweat lodges.22 
Unlike other anomalies in constitutional law, this one has 
garnered near-total acceptance. In a rare display of unanimity in 
an area where first principles have been contested for decades,23 
courts and scholars have long found that it is not a constitutionally 
significant intrusion upon free speech to limit a speaker’s preferred 
mode of expression, so long as the intrusion leaves open other 
available means by which the speaker may communicate.24 This is 
                                                                                                     
usually a materially different expressive act from the one the speaker chose. See 
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55–56 (1994) (stating that the alternatives 
proposed to respondent for displaying opposition to war efforts “carr[y] a message 
quite distinct” from displaying a sign from one’s residence). 
 20. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)  
[E]ven in a public forum the government may impose reasonable 
restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided 
the restrictions “are justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative 
channels for communication of the information.” 
(quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 
(1984)). 
 21. See id. at 789 (finding alternative avenues of expression, but not 
considering respondent’s input on the stated alternatives). 
 22. Post-Smith, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act sought to protect 
religious exercise from “burdens” imposed by “laws [that are] neutral toward 
religion,” which it deemed as offensive to religious practice “as laws intended to 
interfere with religious exercise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2) (2012). The U.S. 
Congress therefore expressly rejected any distinction between laws that could be 
characterized, to use Speech Clause terminology, as “religious exercise-based” 
and those that are “religious exercise-neutral.” Id.  
 23. See infra Part III.A (referring to the ongoing debate between 
marketplace and self-autonomy theorists as to which theory best supports the 
First Amendment). 
 24. See C. Edwin Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade 
Permits and Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 937, 937 
(1984) [hereinafter Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness] (arguing that subjecting 
time, place, and manner restrictions interfering with expressive conduct to the 
equivalent of a mere reasonableness standard is “possibly the most universally 
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so as to self-autonomy, marketplace, and instrumentalist 
theorists.  
On the self-autonomy front, Daniel Farber and John Nowak 
argue that, “[a]lthough some people may be unable to express 
themselves in the exact physical manner, location, or time they 
find most satisfying, this inconvenience hardly seems a radical 
intrusion into individual autonomy.”25 Similarly, Eugene Volokh 
claims that “a typical law aimed at noncommunicative effects is 
unlikely to excessively inhibit the communication of some 
viewpoint of fact, because many different media would remain 
available to the speakers.”26 As to marketplace theory, Geoffrey 
Stone has argued that the content of the message is not blocked 
from the speech market so long as that content can reach the 
market via some other legal channel accessible to the speaker and 
his audience.27 The restrained expression can thus still contribute 
to the search for truth, so the harm the restriction causes, both to 
the speaker and to listeners participating in the broader speech 
market, is minimal.28 For the instrumentalists, Judge Richard 
Posner compares restrictions on a speaker’s preferred mode of 
communication to a “tax of variable severity on ideas and opinions 
[that make] it more costly for the speaker to reach his audience,” 
analogous to a “tax on newsprint or on broadcast air time, or for 
that matter, an increase in second-class postal rates”29—a burden 
                                                                                                     
accepted tenet of first amendment doctrine”). 
 25. Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public 
Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. 
L. REV. 1219, 1237 (1984). 
 26. Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal 
Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1305 (2005). 
 27. See Stone, supra note 10, at 67 (“In some cases, these ‘time, place, and 
manner’ regulations serve merely a channeling function and have no appreciable 
impact on free expression.”). 
 28. See id. at 68 (“In light of the availability of alternative means of 
expression, it seems doubtful that such restrictions have an appreciable effect on 
the total quantity of public debate.”). 
 29. Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK 
U.L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1986) [hereinafter Posner, Free Speech in an Economic 
Perspective]; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 76 (2001) 
(explaining the impact of modern thinking on free speech). 
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paling in comparison to the “much heavier tax” of a content-based 
restriction on a particular category of ideas.30  
However, there are several unexamined problems with the 
ample alternative channels approach—problems to which the 
claims set out above do not respond. First, one can safely assume 
that by dint of the chosen channel of communication alone, the 
speaker herself has not found alternative channels of 
communication to be analogous. It seems much more than a mere 
“inconvenience,” to use Farber and Nowak’s term,31 to tell a 
speaker she can be punished for using the mode of expression that 
she believed to be most effective, but could have avoided 
punishment if she had chosen a way to communicate the same 
message that she likely viewed as less effective. Accordingly, the 
notion that the availability of substitutes for expressing a given 
idea minimizes the constitutional harm to a barred speaker’s 
freedom of choice offends the self-autonomy-related justifications 
for the First Amendment.32 It also seems wrong to find that the 
marketplace of ideas is not harmed when speakers are barred by 
generally applicable restrictions on the ground that speech could, 
in theory, reach the market in some other way.33 The deprivation 
of the market has already occurred, and from both the speaker’s 
and his intended audience’s perspective, the alternative means by 
which the speech could have reached the market are not true 
contemporaneous substitutes. And Judge Posner’s analogy to taxes 
on modes of speech delivery conflates the concepts of restriction 
and proscription: a “tax on newsprint,” even a significant one, is 
not the same as making newsprint illegal (as opposed to costly) and 
forcing newspaper printers to become broadcasters, corner 
speakers, or bloggers.34  
                                                                                                     
 30. See Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, supra note 29, at 16 
(“A prohibition on all public expression of an idea is a much heavier tax.”).  
 31. Farber & Nowak, supra note 25, at 1237. 
 32. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (“[T]his general 
rule, that the speaker has the right to tailor the speech, applies not only to 
expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to statements of fact 
the speaker would rather avoid . . . .”). 
 33. See Stone, supra note 10, at 65 (stating that not all alternative means of 
expression are perfect and that, in some circumstances, certain means of 
expression may have specific advantages). 
 34. Cf. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, 377 U.S. 58, 
76–80 (1964) (Black, J., concurring) (justifying a restriction on expression on the 
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Speaking of bloggers: with the rise of speech-facilitating 
technologies, there is now no limit to the damage that alternative 
channels analysis can do to free speech.35 Courts have already 
begun to find that thanks to the availability of such technologies, 
an alternative means of expression is always available to any user 
whose speech has been infringed.36 And in a world where the 
existence of YouTube, Blogger, Twitter, or Facebook means that an 
alternative channel to the one chosen is always available, even the 
broadest content-neutral restrictions on speech will increasingly 
survive judicial review.  
To adduce precisely why ample alternative channels analysis 
has won such a hold on First Amendment doctrine, it makes sense 
to consider its origin. And if those foundations are shaky, we might 
be more inclined to examine whether ample alternatives analysis 
serves a proper purpose in balancing the liberty of the speaker 
against the government’s interests in generally applicable 
regulations that infringe on speech.  
Ample alternative channels analysis arose more than fifty 
years ago, in Justice John Marshall Harlan’s concurrence in 
United States v. O’Brien.37 In that seminal case, Harlan stated the 
First Amendment was not offended by O’Brien’s prosecution for 
burning his draft card because O’Brien could have communicated 
his antigovernment, antiwar message by other, legal means.38 The 
                                                                                                     
ground that “other methods of communication are left open” and thus the 
restriction is “on a par with holding that governmental suppression of a 
newspaper in a city would not violate the First Amendment because there 
continue to be radio and television stations”). 
 35. See Interstate Outdoor Adver., L.P. v. Zoning Bd. of Mt. Laurel, 706 F.3d 
527, 535 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Potential alternative channels of communication [for 
prohibited billboards] include on-premises signs, internet advertising, direct 
mail, radio, newspapers, television, sign advertising, and public transportation 
advertising.”); see also Gun Owners’ Action League v. Swift, 284 F.3d 198, 212 
(1st Cir. 2002) (“The restriction challenged here ‘allows for reasonable alternative 
channels of communication.’ Whatever messages the appellants seek to express 
by shooting at human images on targets, those messages may be spread via 
writing, the Internet, word of mouth, or other communication technologies.”). 
 36. See Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Bos., 378 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding 
that the ability to communicate protest messages through mass media qualified 
as a “viable alternative means . . . to enable protesters to communicate their 
messages to the delegates”). 
 37. 391 U.S. 367, 388–89 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 38. See id. at 389 (“O’Brien manifestly could have conveyed his message in 
many ways other than by burning his draft card.”). 
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development of Justice Harlan’s concurrence, however, as 
evidenced through multiple drafts of that concurrence and the 
majority opinion in the case—none of which have ever been 
examined by scholars until this Article—shows that ample 
alternative channels analysis was in its incipiency a misguided 
afterthought.39 By dint of its being incorporated into the test for 
content-neutral restrictions and applied in subsequent cases, 
however, the concept now carries dispositive force in First 
Amendment doctrine.40 It is time to save the doctrine, and the 
interests it is intended to protect, from the tyranny of the 
afterthought. 
With the help of Justice Harlan’s case files in O’Brien, Part II 
of this Article discusses the birth of the ample alternative channels 
analysis and its role in the content-discrimination doctrine’s 
intermediate scrutiny standard of review.41 Part III critiques  
ample alternative channels analysis because in its blanket 
treatment of alternatives as dispositive to the First Amendment 
issue, it fails to differentiate those cases in which the speaker’s 
chosen mode of expression is as worthy of protection as the 
message expressed thereby.42 In terms of practical consequences, 
this Part also shows that ample alternative channels analysis often 
yields inconsistent and speech-averse results in a range of 
contexts—a problem that will only be compounded by the current 
emergence of technology-facilitated speech.43 In closing, Part III 
argues that the Supreme Court’s longstanding distinction between 
content-based and content-neutral restrictions cannot support the 
                                                                                                     
 39. See id. (concurring with majority’s determination of when a government 
regulation is sufficiently justified and adding additional language concerning 
alternative ways for O’Brien to communicate his message). 
 40. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test that Ate Everything: Intermediate 
Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 790 (2007) 
(explaining that in content-neutral cases, “the Court will uphold regulations of 
speech so long as, in its, view, the regulation keeps open for that speaker ample 
alternative, and effective, channels of communication”); Harold L. Quadres, 
Content-Neutral Public Forum Regulations: The Rise of the Aesthetic State 
Interest, the Fall of Judicial Scrutiny, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 439, 490 (1986) 
[hereinafter Quadres, Content-Neutral Public Forum Regulations] (stating that 
the “alternative access question” is the “touchstone of the whole balancing 
process” in assessing content-neutral regulations). 
 41. Infra Part II. 
 42. Infra Part III. 
 43. Infra Part III.  
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use of ample alternative channels analysis in the latter type of case 
but not the former.44 
Turning to recommendations, Part IV proposes that in lieu of 
ample alternative channels analysis, courts reviewing content-
neutral regulations should ask whether permitting the speaker’s 
use of her chosen channel of communication is incompatible with 
the government’s interest in adopting the regulation in question.45 
Incompatibility is a more rigorous standard than the 
reasonableness approach that has come to govern content 
neutrality analysis.46 It will protect the speaker’s chosen mode of 
expression in most cases, except those in which permitting the 
speaker’s chosen mode of expression would frustrate a compelling 
governmental interest in near-totality.47 In other words, the focus 
is not where the current doctrine places it—on whether the 
speaker could have met her communicative goals by expressing the 
content of her message in another legal way. Rather, the inquiry is 
whether the government could not have achieved its legislative 
goals if the speaker had been able to express her message in the 
desired manner. An incompatibility standard would also be able to 
differentiate between conduct that merely facilitates speech and 
conduct that is itself communicative or otherwise essential to the 
speaker’s expressive act, which is a distinction that modern First 
Amendment doctrine has merged right out of the law. Finally, 
abandoning ample alternative channels analysis in favor of 
incompatibility would be consistent with the Roberts Court’s turn 
toward a pro-speaker view of the First Amendment—a view that 
rigorously reviews even content-neutral restrictions on speech, as 
evidenced in last Term’s McCullen v. Coakley.48  
                                                                                                     
 44. Infra Part III. 
 45. Infra Part IV.  
 46. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (articulating 
the reasonableness standard that currently governs restrictions “on the time, 
place, or many of protected speech”). 
 47. See Rosenbaum v. City of S.F., 484 F.3d 1142, 1167 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(stating an “incompatibility” standard that must be proved by the State to deny 
appellants free speech in the public forum). 
 48. See 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2541 (2014) (“[The Commonwealth has pursued 
those interests by the extreme step of closing a substantial portion of a traditional 
public forum to all speakers . . . . The Commonwealth may not do that consistent 
with the First Amendment.”). 
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II. The Birth of Ample Alternative Channels Analysis: Justice 
Harlan’s O’Brien Opinion 
To better understand the role alternative channels analysis is 
intended to play in Free Speech doctrine, we should start with the 
analysis’s source. When looking for origin stories in constitutional 
law, one can easily find statements in cases that were 
afterthoughts at the time, but later serve as the foundations upon 
which subsequent courts build legal doctrine.49 But excavating 
those statements can uncover mismatches between the context and 
principles animating the statements at the time of their making on 
the one hand, and their application to modern controversies on the 
other—mismatches that current law, building upon itself through 
the common law process of decision, can be blind to.50 
For present purposes, the statement being excavated first 
appeared in a tent-pole First Amendment case: David Paul 
O’Brien’s conviction under the Selective Service Act (SSA or Act) 
for burning his draft card on the steps of the South Boston 
Courthouse in protest of the Vietnam War.51 Alternative channels 
analysis was born not in the O’Brien majority opinion, however, 
but rather in Justice Harlan’s concurrence.52 And an earlier 
version of that latter opinion had much bigger game in its sights: 
what Harlan viewed as the dangerous logical fallacy of the Court’s 
distinguishing between speech and content in First Amendment 
cases.53 
                                                                                                     
 49. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 198 
SUP. CT. REV. 397, 398–99 (1987) (discussing a footnote about strict scrutiny of 
individual rights becoming the takeaway of a case about the federal “Filled Milk 
Act”); David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251, 
1263–65 (2010) (discussing the doctrinal implications of Justice Stone’s footnote 
in Carolene Products). 
 50. See Miller, supra note 49, at 398 (listing numerous legal doctrinal 
developments that have surfaced as a result of a footnote where “[t]he facts were 
not the stuff of great decisions”). 
 51. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369 (1968) (“David Paul 
O’Brien and three companions burned their Selective Service registration 
certificates on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse . . . . For this act, O’Brien 
was indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced in the United States District Court 
for the District of Massachusetts.”). 
 52. See id. at 389 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“O'Brien manifestly could have 
conveyed his message in many ways other than by burning his draft card.”). 
 53. See Justice Harlan, Concurring Draft Opinion Circulated Apr. 1968: 
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A. Briefing, Argument, and the First Draft Majority Opinion 
After being convicted in Massachusetts federal court for 
violating the “no willful destruction” section of the SSA by burning 
his draft card, O’Brien appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit.54 That court held that O’Brien’s conviction 
violated the First Amendment.55 In the Supreme Court, the United 
States challenged the First Circuit’s reversal of O’Brien’s 
conviction.56  
On the First Amendment question, the United States’ merits 
brief argued that “the decisive consideration” in determining 
whether conduct like O’Brien’s was protected speech was whether 
it fit within those “limited class of activities” that are 
“[1.] inextricably tied to oral expression or [2.] where no reasonably 
effective alternative means of communication [are] available.”57 As 
to the first question, the United States claimed that burning a 
draft card was not protected symbolic speech because it was not “a 
natural extension of [a] verbalization,” not integral to a 
concomitant “oral expression[’s] meaning,” and not “the manifest 
equivalent of, or traditionally recognized substitute for, a verbal 
statement.”58 As to the second alternative showing under its 
proposed test, the Government argued that “other effective means 
for expressing” the ideas communicated by the conduct that 
O’Brien engaged in “plainly exist,” and that those means, unlike 
                                                                                                     
United States v. O’Brien at 2 (Harlan, J., concurring), in John Marshall Harlan 
Papers, Box 311, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University 
[hereinafter Harlan Papers, Box 311] (“This double-barreled approach seems to 
me hopelessly to confuse two separate definitional problems presented by the 
language of the First Amendment.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 54. O’Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538, 539–40 (1st Cir. 1967), vacated 
391 U.S. 367, 369 (1968). 
 55. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 370–71 (“On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit held the 1965 Amendment unconstitutional as a law abridging 
freedom of speech”). 
 56. See id. at 372 (“The government petitioned for certiorari in No. 232, 
arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in holding the statute 
unconstitutional . . . .”); see also Brief for the United States at 7–8, United States 
v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) [hereinafter O’Brien United States Brief] (setting 
forth the United States’ arguments for challenging reversal).  
 57. O’Brien United States Brief, supra note 56, at 8. 
 58. Id. at 15. 
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draft-card burning, “do not interfere in any significant way with 
the orderly functioning of government.”59 O’Brien and like-minded 
protestors had such “other effective means” to convey their views, 
ranging from “the use of mass communication media” to “the public 
meeting hall” to “peaceable demonstration” to “the distribution of 
literature.”60 In response, O’Brien argued that the Court’s cases 
established “a constitutional right to deliver one’s speech at the 
place where, the time when, and the manner in which the speaker 
deems it to be most effective.”61 That right, claimed O’Brien, 
“include[s] the right to make the most dramatic and compelling 
speech possible,” subject to narrow limitations.62  
After oral argument, at which the Solicitor General reiterated 
the Government’s argument that O’Brien was free “at all times to 
express dissent by speech from the courthouse steps or on the 
street corners, by letters to the editor, by pamphlet, by radio and 
television,”63 the Government’s position prevailed. Chief Justice 
Warren’s first draft opinion for the majority circulated on April 12, 
1968.64 Consistent with only the first part of how the Government 
had litigated the symbolic speech question, however, Warren’s 
opinion turned exclusively on the speech-conduct distinction.65 
Warren found that burning draft cards, even in protest of military 
action, was conduct and not speech—and was thus not protected 
by the First Amendment.66 
                                                                                                     
 59. Id. at 19. 
 60. Id. at 19–20. 
 61. Brief for O’Brien at 11, United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), 
(Nos. 232, 233) [hereinafter O’Brien Brief].  
 62. Id. at 40. 
 63. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 
367 (1968) (Nos. 232, 233); see also id. at 11 (stating the SSA is “not fairly to be 
regarded as an abridgement of freedom of speech when it does not involve speech 
in any way and when all avenues of speech remain open to the defendant” 
(emphasis added)).  
 64. Chief Justice Warren, Majority Draft Opinion Circulated Apr. 12, 1968: 
United States v. O’Brien at 1 in Harlan Papers, Box 311 [hereinafter Majority 
First Draft] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 65. See id. at 18 (“[T]he core concern of the [First] Amendment is . . . verbal 
expression . . . .”). 
 66. See id. at 7–8 (“The 1965 Amendment [subjecting to criminal liability 
anyone who knowingly destroys a certificate] on its face deals with conduct having 
no connection with speech.”). 
THE “AMPLE ALTERNATIVE CHANNELS” FLAW 1673 
Warren’s first analytical step was to affirm that the Act did 
not facially infringe upon speech.67 As a general matter, there was 
nothing “necessarily expressive,” Warren noted, about the conduct 
that the Act prevented.68 Next, and with respect to O’Brien’s as-
applied claim alleging that his conduct was expressive and 
therefore protected, Warren’s opinion held firmly that even though 
the Court had “no reason to doubt” that O’Brien “intended by 
burning his certificate to express his disagreement with the war 
and the draft,” O’Brien’s “conduct of burning his certificate was not 
speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.”69  
With the Government’s position as a starting point for his 
analysis, Warren rejected O’Brien’s position that the First 
Amendment protected symbolic speech, driving a broad wedge 
between words and conduct—even conduct intended to be 
expressive—for First Amendment purposes.70 He did so first by 
placing conduct as far subordinate to verbal utterances in the free 
speech hierarchy: 
The view of the First Amendment advanced by O’Brien is 
premised upon a definition of ‘speech’ that bears no resemblance 
to the meaning and usage of that word in our society. Under this 
view, any act done by an individual would be speech if the 
individual intended by the act to express any idea, and at some 
time made known his intent . . . . The multitude of decided cases 
corroborate what is in any event apparent on the face of the 
[Speech and Press] clauses—that their core meaning and 
concern is with verbal expression, the spoken and written 
utterance of words . . . . From its adoption through the present 
time, the traditional, normal, and by far most important way 
that people in our society have expressed their ideas is by using 
language.71  
So the “spoken and written utterance” was at the core of the 
Speech Clause’s concerns, and to stray from that core was to depart 
                                                                                                     
 67. See id. at 8 (“[The 1965 Amendment] prohibits the knowing destruction 
of certificates issued by the Selective Service System, and there is nothing 
necessarily expressive about such conduct.”). 
 68. Id. at 8. 
 69. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). 
 70. See id. at 17 (stating that the cases decided on this confirm that the 
clauses of the First Amendment concern “verbal expression, the spoken and 
written utterance of words”). 
 71. Id. at 17–18. 
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not only from First Amendment text, history, and tradition, but 
also from common conceptions regarding the sharing of ideas that 
have been widely held from the Founding to the present day.  
Warren admitted, however, that under the Court’s previous 
cases, one narrow category of conduct did merit First Amendment 
protection, noting that “the Amendment would have a rather 
narrow compass if it embraced only the initial utterance of words. 
The conception of freedom of communication embodied in the 
Amendment by definition draws within its ambit behavior engaged 
as a means of communicating, that is of disseminating or 
transmitting, uttered words.”72 According to Warren, examples of 
such verbal expression-disseminating conduct that could fall 
within the Speech Clause’s protection included assemblies to 
discuss matters of public interest,73 a speaker’s use of sound 
amplification devices,74 union soliciting without a permit,75 and 
“distributing . . . printed material.”76 Only conduct that was “a 
natural extension of a verbalization” was protected.77 Speech-
facilitating conduct, in other words, was protectable, but conduct 
intended to communicate nonverbally, or what would later come to 
be known as symbolic speech, did not implicate the First 
Amendment at all.  
Based on his distinction between conduct that was 
unprotected even if intended to be expressive and conduct that was 
“a means for the dissemination of verbal expression” and thus 
protected,78 Warren concluded that “burning a document”79 fell 
into the former category.80 Such an act was “wholly unrelated to 
the employment of language, and consequently, its protection is of 
no moment to the core concern of the First Amendment.”81 
“Preventing people from burning things,” Warren concluded, “in no 
                                                                                                     
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. (citing Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939)). 
 74. Id. (citing Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948)). 
 75. Id. (citing Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958)). 
 76. Id. at 19 (citing Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877); Schneider v. State, 
308 U.S. 147 (1939); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)).  
 77. Id. at 20. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 20–21. 
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way impinges on their freedom to communicate ideas through 
language.”82 Accordingly, punishing O’Brien for an act that was 
“far-removed from what we mean by the word speech in our 
society” did not implicate the First Amendment.83  
Concluding, Warren summarized his proposed “commonsense” 
holding for the Court, finding that 
[a]n act unrelated to the employment of language is not speech 
within the First Amendment if as a matter of fact the act has 
an immediate harmful impact completely apart from any 
impact arising by virtue of the claimed communication itself. 
And if the Government . . . has attached legal consequences to 
that noncommunicative impact, those consequences may be 
enforced against the person who committed the act.84 
B. Justice Harlan’s Response: Ample Alternative Channels Is Born 
Upon receipt of Chief Justice Warren’s first draft for the 
majority, Justice Harlan set out over the latter half of April 1968 
to draft a concurrence.85 Harlan’s lengthy draft would express deep 
concern with the Warren draft’s rejection of the idea that the First 
Amendment could protect symbolic conduct. The first draft of 
Harlan’s concurrence, circulated on May 1, 1968, stated the Justice 
was “in full accord with the reversal” of the First Circuit’s holding 
in O’Brien’s favor, yet Harlan was “unable to subscribe to the 
process of reasoning by which the Court concludes that O’Brien’s 
conviction for draft card burning . . . did not violate his right to free 
speech as assured by the First Amendment.”86 That reasoning, 
Harlan continued, employed “restrictions on the reach of the First 
                                                                                                     
 82. Id. at 21. 
 83. Id. at 22. 
 84. Id. at 23. 
 85. See Justice John M. Harlan, First Draft Concurring Opinion Dated May 
1968: United States v. O’Brien and Justice John M. Harlan, First Draft 
Concurring Opinion Circulated May 1, 1968: United States v. O’Brien 
[hereinafter First Draft Concurrence] in Harlan Papers, Box 311 (“I find myself 
unable to subscribe to the process of reasoning by which the Court concludes that 
O’Brien’s conviction for draft card burning, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. App. § 462 
(b)(3), did not violate his right of free speech assured by the First Amendment.”). 
The quotations cited here are from the draft opinion dated “May 1968,” but the 
two drafts cited in this section are materially similar. 
 86. Id.  
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Amendment” that were “illogical, unsound, and in conflict” with 
the Court’s prior cases.87 Harlan called for “an entirely different 
approach” to restrictions on nonverbal expression than that 
propounded by Warren’s draft.88 
The primary flaw in Warren’s reasoning, according to Harlan, 
was to deem that the First Amendment protects “nonverbal 
expression if it is prohibited solely because of its ‘communicative’ 
effect, but not otherwise.”89 Recall here Warren’s (and by extension 
the Court’s, if the Warren majority draft were adopted) analytical 
two-step, in which (1) “only verbal activity may qualify as ‘speech’”; 
and (2) only those restrictions on conduct which are aimed at the 
conduct’s “speech”-like or “speech”-facilitating attributes, or its 
dissemination of “uttered speech,” implicate the First 
Amendment.90 In Harlan’s view, that method of analysis would 
have led to “results inconsistent both with the First Amendment’s 
purpose and with its prior construction.”91  
For example, noted Harlan, a government seeking to suppress 
speech could simply aim its laws at the noncommunicative aspects 
of conduct intended to communicate a message, and in so doing, 
avoid the First Amendment altogether: 
Suppose that a citizen of the District of Columbia flies a large, 
moth-eaten, unsightly red flag at a low altitude in his front 
yard, as a protest against organized government, and by so 
doing runs afoul of a generally worded zoning ordinance. [Under 
the Court’s draft opinion,] the citizen would not even be 
entitled . . . to raise the First Amendment in defense at his trial, 
because his action does not amount to “speech,” but involves 
only “conduct.” Now suppose that the same citizen flies the 
same flag for exactly the same reason, and is prosecuted under 
another statute making it an offense to display a red flag in 
protest against organized government. [This prosecution, by 
contrast,] must fail because of the First Amendment. Yet to me 
it seems but sleight of hand to suggest that the First 
Amendment has come into play because the very same activity, 
undertaken for precisely the same reason, has been 
                                                                                                     
 87. Id. at 1. 
 88. Id. at 1–2. 
 89. Id. at 2. 
 90. See supra notes 78–86 and accompanying text (discussing Warren’s draft 
opinion). 
 91. First Draft Concurrence, supra note 85, at 4. 
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transformed from “nonspeech” to “speech” [when a]ll that has 
changed is the form of the statute.92  
Harlan’s “red flag” hypothetical, based on Stromberg v. 
California,93 a case decided by the Court three decades before, 
showed that under Warren’s approach, the state could decide 
through regulation whether expressive conduct was 
constitutionally protected or not—which was no way to interpret 
the Constitution.94 Harlan also noted that the consequences of 
Warren’s strict speech-conduct distinction would have pernicious 
effects on speakers’ communicative choices ex ante as well. 
According to Harlan, Warren’s approach ignored the principle that 
nonverbal conduct can “greatly enhance the force of the spoken or 
written word.”95 Presuming conduct was not protected by the First 
Amendment, Harlan argued, would deprive speakers of giving 
“extra impact to the ideas they are seeking to communicate.”96 
Accordingly, presuming the lawfulness of restrictions on symbolic 
conduct would “compel persons to choose less effective means of 
communicating their ideas”—in effect self-censorship of symbolic 
speech.97  
Having shown the deleterious effects of the draft majority 
opinion’s broad proposed holding, Harlan next proposed an 
alternative approach, under which “governmental interference 
with the performance of any act undertaken to aid in the 
communication of an idea . . . may” raise a First Amendment 
question.98 However, unlike Warren’s order of analysis, which 
would rely on his speech versus conduct distinction to decide as an 
initial matter whether the First Amendment applies to the conduct 
                                                                                                     
 92. Id. at 3. 
 93. 283 U.S. 359 (1931). 
 94. See First Draft Concurrence, supra note 87  
Hence, if the Court’s opinion is to retain logical coherence, it must be 
read as saying that a statute which interferes with communication in 
the course of implementing a legitimate, non-ideological governmental 
objective does not amount to a “law . . . abridging” speech, while a 
statute which prohibits expression on account of the ideas 
communicated does. However, this reasoning is also inadequate to 
support. 
 95. Id. at 4. 
 96. Id. at 5. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 6 (first emphasis added). 
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in question at all, Harlan proposed to apply a “balancing” test to 
regulations which “though in term [are] aimed at 
noncommunicative activity, may in some applications interfere 
with expression.”99 Harlan’s test would ask “whether the 
Government,” through a narrowly drawn statute, “has forbidden 
conduct in circumstances where the governmental interests served 
by the prohibition outweigh its impact on communication.”100  
Unlike the draft majority opinion’s, Harlan’s approach would 
lead to the conclusion that O’Brien’s “act . . . of burning his draft 
card was within the scope of the ‘speech’ clause of the First 
Amendment.”101 However, like the draft majority opinion, Harlan 
in the end found O’Brien’s prosecution was constitutional. The 
government’s interests in preventing destruction of draft cards and 
ensuring that prospective draftees had their cards on their person 
at all times were, as both Warren’s and Harlan’s drafts recognized, 
significant. And on the other side of Harlan’s scale, O’Brien’s 
“interest in lending force to his protest by burning his draft card” 
did not outweigh the government’s.102 What is most interesting 
about Harlan’s draft for the purposes of this Article, however, is 
the method Harlan proposed using to weigh the speaker’s interest 
in such a case.  
With respect to weighing O’Brien’s interest in expressing his 
message in the manner he chose, Harlan turned to the argument 
made in the Government’s brief and at oral argument, but 
unmentioned by Chief Justice Warren’s draft: “in measuring the 
effect of a statute on communication, it is relevant to consider the 
alternative means of expression which are available.”103 Applying 
that principle to the present case, Harlan argued that even though 
O’Brien’s chosen form of expression “did achieve a far wider 
dissemination of his ideas than if he had merely made a speech to 
the same effect,” “alternative means of communication . . . were 
available” for him to communicate the same message.104  
                                                                                                     
 99. Id. at 7–8. 
 100. Id. at 7.  
 101. Id. at 7. 
 102. Id. at 9. 
 103. Justice John M. Harlan, Internal First Draft of Concurrence: United 
States v. O’Brien at 21 [hereinafter Internal First Draft of Concurrence] in Harlan 
Papers, Box 311. 
 104. Id. at 9–10. 
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“For example,” Harlan continued, “O’Brien might have burned 
a facsimile of his draft card and a copy of the [Act] or regulations,” 
or “he might have employed a number of other lawful means, 
verbal and nonverbal, of publicizing his ideas at approximately the 
same time and place.”105 According to Harlan, “[t]he alternative 
means of communication which were available” to a speaker who 
has been punished for a communicative act—someone in Harlan’s 
chambers went so far as to hand-write the phrase in the margin of 
the typed, marked-up internal draft of his concurrence that he 
wrote prior to his draft for circulation106—should be part of the 
analysis in assessing the law in question’s effect on communication 
and the extent to which it burdened protected speech.  
  
                                                                                                     
 105. Id. at 10. 
 106. Id. at 21. Tinsley Yarbrough, Justice Harlan’s biographer, informs me 
that the handwriting is that of a law clerk’s; because of Harlan’s failing eyesight, 
Harlan’s opinion drafting process involved a clerk reading written drafts to 
Harlan, and then Harlan’s dictating edits to the draft back to the clerk. See E-
mail from Tinsley Yarbrough to Enrique Armijo (Apr. 29, 2015, 11:21AM) (on file 
with the author); see also TINSLEY YARBROUGH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: GREAT 
DISSENTER OF THE WARREN COURT 324–25 (1992) (discussing Harlan’s failing 
eyesight and how it shaped the work process of his Chambers). 
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Text from internal draft opinion of Justice John Marshall Harlan in United States 
v. O’Brien, n.d. (drafted April/May 1968). The “alternative means of expression 
which are available” formulation is set out in the handwritten note in the left 
margin. John Marshall Harlan Papers, Box 311, Mudd Manuscript Library, 
Princeton University. 
Remember from the beginning of this Section that at oral 
argument, the Solicitor General claimed that O’Brien’s First 
Amendment rights were not abridged by his prosecution because 
he or any another war protestor could give a speech “from the 
courthouse steps,” “on the street,” or in “public meeting halls”; 
“peaceably demonstrate,” “distribute literature” and “send letters 
to the editor”; or use “mass communication media.”107 Harlan’s 
analysis considered whether these “alternative means of 
communication” were actually analogous to the means O’Brien 
chose; in his final circulated draft, Harlan made sure to note that 
the alternatives he listed could allow O’Brien to “substantially 
duplicate” the “force” that burning a draft card “add[ed] to [his] 
ideas.”108 But this analytical turn in Harlan’s draft, which was a 
                                                                                                     
 107. Supra text accompanying notes 23–30. 
 108. Justice John M. Harlan, Final Draft Concurrence Circulated May 1, 
1968: United States v. O’Brien at 11 [hereinafter Final Draft Concurrence] in 
Harlan Papers, Box 311. 
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sidecar added after-the-fact to his main point, raises a larger 
question: Why did Harlan consider alternative means of 
communication at all?  
It is illogical to weigh—or more precisely, to abate the weight 
of—an individual’s interest in making a choice by pointing to other 
choices the individual could have made, but did not. Indeed, the 
presence of alternative modes by which O’Brien could have 
communicated his message would more logically call for giving his 
interest in making the choice more weight, not less. O’Brien may 
well have considered burning a photocopy of his draft card or of the 
SSA, but he chose to burn the genuine article instead due to the 
difference in communicative impact between burning that copy 
and the actual card. Harlan characterized the interest to be 
balanced against the government’s as O’Brien’s interest in the 
communicative choice to burn his draft card “in order to add impact 
to his expression of ideas.”109 If that is so, it does O’Brien no service 
to find that the result of his choice—the burning of the actual card 
rather than a copy—minimizes his interest in making it.  
What is going on here is that Harlan is not weighing an 
interest at all. Rather, he is attempting to distinguish O’Brien’s 
prosecution from those cases in which a generally applicable 
restriction on conduct has the effect of curtailing or eliminating the 
speaker’s expression altogether—an effect he deemed was absent 
from the present case. Like Warren, Harlan was concerned with 
incidental restrictions on speech that barred a means for the 
“dissemination” of verbal expression.110 But in resolving his 
concerns, Harlan wound himself into the same knot that Warren’s 
draft opinion sought, to its credit, to untie: failing to distinguish 
between conduct that facilitates speech on the one hand, and 
conduct that is itself communicative on the other.  
As noted above, immediately after pointing to the alternative 
legal ways in which O’Brien could have expressed his message, 
Harlan’s draft concurrence notes that O’Brien’s chosen act was 
“therefore in no way analogous to such sometimes essential means 
of expression as the dissemination of handbills o[r] the door-to-door 
distribution of circulars.”111 In other words, a ban on destroying a 
                                                                                                     
 109. Id. at 10. 
 110. Majority First Draft, supra note 64, at 20. 
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draft card is not like banning leafleting, because there are other 
ways to communicate the underlying message that destroying a 
draft card expresses; but a ban on leafleting has the same effect as 
banning the message in the leaflet. By Harlan’s lights, if there is 
no other way to communicate the message at issue, then the 
speaker’s expressive interest in the speech facilitating-content in 
question is significant and the restriction on it, even if not aimed 
at expression, must not stand. But if there is some other way to 
communicate the message, then the speaker’s expressive interest 
in the speech-facilitating content of her choice is minimal, and the 
government’s restriction on the particular mode at issue is more 
likely to be lawful.  
This distinction does not persuade, however, for a vitally 
important First Amendment-related reason: It has no connection 
whatsoever to the expressiveness of the proscribed conduct in 
question. Burning a draft card is not a means of communicating 
expression or a dramatic device intended to attract attention to an 
expressive message; it is itself expressive. No more proof for this 
point need be proffered than to consider the difference between the 
mode of expression chosen by O’Brien and the alternatives that 
Justice Harlan claimed were available to him and “substantially 
duplicated” the same “force.”112 Burning a copy of a draft card says 
something altogether different than burning the card itself. 
Accordingly, in a symbolic speech case, banning the act bans the 
message, and the fact the message could have been communicated 
in some other way should be constitutionally irrelevant.113 Indeed, 
the failure to treat such alternatives as irrelevant does affirmative 
harm to the speaker’s communicative rights. Harlan’s refusal to 
distinguish between a means and a message led directly to the 
alternative means of communication analysis that bedevils First 
Amendment doctrine to this day. 
                                                                                                     
original; corrected in Circulated draft of May 1, 1968) (citing Harry Kalven, The 
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 112. Supra text accompanying note 63. 
 113. See Timothy Zick, Cross Burning, Cockfighting, and Symbolic Meaning: 
Toward a First Amendment Ethnography, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2261, 2276 
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To further demonstrate the point, consider Martin v. City of 
Struthers,114 the case that Harlan cited for the proposition that 
burning a draft card is distinct from the “essential means of 
expression” of “the door-to-door distribution of circulars.”115 There, 
Thelma Martin, a Jehovah’s Witness, was convicted under a 
Struthers, Ohio ordinance barring the ringing of doorbells for the 
purpose of handing the home’s resident a handbill.116 In an opinion 
by Justice Black, the Court reversed Martin’s conviction, finding 
no basis for the ordinance other than “the naked restriction of the 
dissemination of ideas.”117 In so holding, the Court noted that “door 
to door campaigning is one of the most accepted techniques of 
seeking popular support,” that “the circulation of nominating 
papers would be greatly handicapped if they could not be taken to 
the citizens in their homes,” and, most colorfully, that “door to door 
distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes 
of little people.”118 
O’Brien relied upon Struthers in arguing his case to the Court, 
citing it for the proposition that “the speaker has the right to 
choose the place where he can be most effective.”119 Indeed, there 
was no discussion whatsoever in Justice Black’s Struthers opinion 
regarding legal alternatives available to Martin that may have 
been as expressive as the conduct barred by the ordinance—
including, as Justice Jackson noted in dissent, the fact that a home 
visitor was “free to make the distribution if he left the householder 
undisturbed, to take it in in his own time.”120 Black apparently 
                                                                                                     
 114. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).  
 115. Supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 116. Martin, 319 U.S. at 142. 
 117. Id. at 147. Despite Justice Black’s rejection of a distinction of legal 
significance between speech and content in Struthers, he was the Justice most 
supportive of Chief Justice Warren’s first draft for the majority in O’Brien. See 
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Papers, Box 311. 
 118. Martin, 319 U.S. at 146. 
 119. O’Brien Brief, supra note 63, at 41. 
 120. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 177 (1943) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting). 
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rejected those alternatives out of hand on the ground that it was 
for Martin, not the government, to decide what conduct might most 
effectively communicate her speech. The sine qua non relation of 
door-to-door distribution of handbills to the expression distributed 
therein was thus taken as a given.  
But in a First Amendment world where dispositive weight is 
given to alternative means in some cases but not others, is it in fact 
a given? Even by Black’s terms in Struthers, door-to-door 
distribution is not inherently expressive in and of itself, nor is a 
restriction on that mode of distribution content-based. It is rather 
a restriction on one “technique” by which a message can be 
expressed.121 The means of door-to-door handbilling says nothing 
about the contents of a particular issue of The Watchtower, or 
about the tenets of the Witness faith. And the availability of 
alternative means seems much more relevant to a law that 
incidentally burdens speech by banning “techniques” for 
expression than to a law that bans the expressive act itself, as was 
the case in a symbolic speech case like O’Brien. Indeed, as Harlan’s 
draft opinion’s cite to Struthers and the references to the 
“dissemination of handbills o[r] the door-to-door distribution of 
circulars” indicate, it was the cases involving “techniques” for 
disseminating speech that were the Justice’s motivating 
concern.122  
To use ample alternative means analysis as Harlan did—
namely, as a basis for finding that bans on expressive conduct are 
more permissible than bans on speech-facilitating conduct—is to 
endorse a result that is the exact opposite than the one that the 
First Amendment should abide. And even worse, under current 
doctrine, once a speech-abridging law is deemed content neutral, it 
is irrelevant in a particular First Amendment dispute whether it 
is the speaker’s mode of speech (burning a draft card; live nude 
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dancing;123 outdoor sleeping124) or her means of disseminating 
speech (hand-billing125; sign-posting126; sound truck 
amplification127) that is being abridged. So long as other adequate 
legal means exist to disseminate what a reviewing court deems is 
an analogous message, the restriction in either kind of case is going 
to stand. Perhaps Harlan himself, whose primary motivating 
concern in responding to Warren’s draft majority opinion was 
protecting speech-facilitating conduct from laws of general 
applicability, might not have countenanced such a result. 
C. Chief Justice Warren’s Revised Majority Opinion and Justice 
Harlan’s Withdrawal of His Draft Concurrence 
After receiving Justice Harlan’s draft concurrence on May 1, 
Chief Justice Warren revised (or to use Warren’s word, 
“rewrote”128) his opinion to address Harlan’s concerns. In this 
second draft for the majority, circulated on May 15, Warren 
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 125. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 848 (1976) (“The noncandidate 
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 126. See Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 
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whether that prohibition abridges appellees' freedom of speech within the 
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 127. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (“[T]he ordinance bars sound 
trucks from broadcasting in a loud and raucous manner on the streets. There is 
no restriction upon the communication of ideas or discussion of issues . . . . We 
think that the need for reasonable protection in the homes . . . justifies the 
ordinance.”).  
 128. Chief Justice Warren, Final Draft Majority Opinion Circulated May 15, 
1968: United States v. O’Brien at 1 (handwritten note on p. 1 stating “Rewritten 
Starting with p. 7”) [hereinafter Final Draft Majority Opinion] in Harlan Papers, 
Box 311. 
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removed all of the excerpts quoted supra concerning a strict legal 
division between speech and content. In their place, he substituted 
a much narrower First Amendment analysis, the “crux” of which, 
as Harlan called it, was elements that are now familiar from the 
intermediate scrutiny test applied to content-neutral regulations:  
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it [1] is 
within the constitutional power of the government; [2.] furthers 
an important or substantial governmental interest; [3.] if the 
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression; and [4.] if the incidental restriction on alleged 
freedom is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that 
interest.129 
Instead of declaring, as he did in his first draft, that O’Brien’s 
conduct was insufficiently tied to “disseminating or transmitting 
uttered speech” to merit protection, Warren now “assum[ed] that 
the alleged communicative element in O’Brien’s conduct is 
sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment.”130 At Harlan’s 
urging, Warren the First Amendment line-drawer had become 
Warren the balancer. Within two days of its circulation, five other 
Justices had joined the new draft opinion.131  
 Three days later, on May 20, 1968, Harlan wrote the Chief 
Justice, noting that the “recirculated opinion . . . m[et] all of the 
difficulties which [he] endeavored to express in the concurrence 
that [he] recently circulated”132 with one caveat that would go on 
to form the basis for Harlan’s final, much shorter (single-page, in 
fact) concurrence. That caveat involved those “hard” cases (though 
Harlan stressed that “in [his] view, O’Brien [was] not one”) “in 
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which an incidental restriction on expression would in practice 
have such a severe impact that a serious question would be raised 
whether even a ‘substantial’ governmental interest would 
necessarily be sufficient to justify it.”133  
In his final published concurrence, Harlan expanded on this 
idea, noting that a future case could be conceived where an 
incidental restriction “has the effect of entirely preventing a 
‘speaker’ from reaching a significant audience with whom he could 
not otherwise lawfully communicate,” and in such a case the Court 
might ask whether any governmental interest, let alone an 
“important or substantial” one, could justify such a restriction.134 
This was not such a case, however, because as both Harlan’s longer 
draft and published short concurrence noted, O’Brien “manifestly 
could have conveyed his message in many ways other than by 
burning his draft card,” and he thus could have “reached a 
significant audience” with his intended message by lawful 
means.135 This is the form of ample alternative channels analysis 
that would later be incorporated into the test for content-neutral 
restrictions on speech, joining Chief Justice Warren’s four-part test 
from the final majority draft in the Court’s later time, place, and 
manner cases.136 
Though these last two sentences were all that remained of 
Harlan’s ample alternative means analysis in his final 
concurrence, his accompanying memorandum to the Chief 
                                                                                                     
 133. Id. at 1; see also United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 389 (1968) 
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expanded on those types of “hard cases” he had in mind, offering 
in effect a fifth prong to the four-part test that Warren had 
proposed: “If application of the regulation does not have the effect 
of preventing a ‘speaker’ from reaching a significant audience with 
which he has no reasonably equivalent, lawful means of 
communicating.”137 
In other words, according to Harlan, in order for a channel of 
communication to substitute for the one the speaker chose, 
reviewing courts should consider the alternative channel’s 
effectiveness relative to the speaker’s channel in terms of audience 
reach, expressiveness, and other factors.  
These qualifiers—“significant audience” and “reasonably 
equivalent”—were not included in Harlan’s final concurrence, 
though, as discussed in Part IV infra, the law of ample alternative 
channels would in effect incorporate them, albeit inconsistently, in 
later cases. But whether such factors are considered or not, the 
fundamental flaw in ample alternative channels analysis would 
remain. With respect to the self-fulfillment and truth-finding 
values that the First Amendment seeks to affirm, there is often 
little difference between the speaker’s mode of expression and the 
expression itself. A court’s finding that a lawful alternative is 
available to the speaker, and deciding a case in the government’s 
favor on that basis, renders the connection between expression and 
mode completely apart. 
* * * 
First Amendment doctrine on symbolic speech completely 
changed in the span of fifteen days in 1968. Thanks to Justice 
Harlan’s impassioned draft concurrence in O’Brien, the Speech 
Clause now protects a range of expressive conduct not directly tied 
to verbal speech that, under Chief Justice Warren’s initial O’Brien 
opinion, would have fallen outside of the First Amendment 
altogether. But because Harlan could not completely support an 
interpretation of the First Amendment that gave a speaker’s mode 
of expression the same weight as the expression itself in symbolic 
speech cases, he proposed ample alternative channels analysis as 
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a way to preserve some government authority over some 
expression-related conduct.  
In its subsequent applications, however, ample alternative 
channels analysis has overtaken not only protection for expressive 
conduct, but also protection for the type of conduct that Chief 
Justice Warren’s draft opinion deemed “a means for the 
dissemination of verbal expression.”138 In so doing, the doctrine has 
come untethered from the foundational, first-principle theories 
and values underlying the First Amendment since its inception.  
III. The Conflict 
A. Conflict with Theory 
As Robert Post has noted, “[d]octrine fulfills its function when 
it accurately accomplishes the purposes of the law.”139 Here, 
doctrine is distorting the First Amendment’s purposes. Ample 
alternatives analysis conflicts with both of the theoretical 
foundations underlying the First Amendment. It conflicts with 
self-autonomy theory on substantive grounds and with 
marketplace theory on procedural grounds. This disconnect has led 
to inconsistent and often speech-averse applications of the doctrine 
in particular cases. As a result, a legal rule that is at odds with the 
interests the Speech Clause is intended to protect is carrying 
dispositive force. 
1. Self-Autonomy Theory 
Self-autonomy as a theoretical justification for freedom of 
speech goes back to John Locke.140 As Locke recognized, the 
principle of government respect for individual choice powers 
autonomy theory.141 Summarizing the moral case for individual 
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choice, Charles Fried writes that “[t]he capacity for judgment, to 
make plans, to choose one’s good, is what we share with other 
persons”; indeed, this capacity is “what makes us persons.”142 And 
recognizing that capacity as inherent within oneself necessarily 
requires that each of us acknowledge and respect that same 
capacity within others. Similarly, Frederick Schauer notes that 
“[i]f we accept the importance of treating each person with equal 
respect, and of treating each person as independently valuable, 
then, the argument goes, we must treat each person’s choices with 
equal respect as well.”143 By contrast, lack of respect for an 
individual’s capacity to choose deprives the disrespected individual 
of dignity and autonomy. It denies “the respect that comes from 
acknowledging his choices to be as worthy as the choices of anyone 
else.”144 
Self-autonomy theory ties to the First Amendment the 
principle that the liberty to “choose one’s [own] good,” to use Fried’s 
phrase, is a value with moral dimension that the state must 
respect.145 Self-autonomy enables the individual in society to “use 
his faculties to the fullest extent.”146 Primary among these faculties 
is the ability to think on one’s own, to choose one’s audience, to 
speak with that audience, and to express and receive ideas, so as 
to achieve that best version of oneself through reason, reflection, 
and exchange.147 Accordingly, for self-autonomy theory, it is the 
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with others in a manner that corresponds to her values.”). 
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speaker’s choice of expression that is, as Ed Baker argues, “the 
crucial factor in justifying protection” of that expression.148  
A self-autonomy theory for the First Amendment is thus 
quintessentially speaker-based, as it is the speaker who will “reap 
the benefits of self-expression and self-realization most directly”—
in other words, the benefits flowing from the speaker’s expressive 
choices.149 Conversely, the law’s suppression of speech-related 
choices offends self-autonomy theory because it represents the 
state’s favoring of the collective will over the dignity of the 
individual.150  
The finest articulation of self-autonomy theory and its relation 
to freedom of speech is in Justice Brandeis’s concurring opinion in 
Whitney v. California.151 As Brandeis wrote, the motivating 
principles behind the Founding were “to make men free to develop 
their faculties,” to value liberty “both as an end and as a means,” 
and “the freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think.”152 
At its core, therefore, self-autonomy is about self-determination, 
and it establishes self-fulfillment as a predicate to participation in 
social change.  
Unfortunately, where all this fits into the content-based 
versus content-neutral distinction that governs Speech Clause 
doctrine is unclear. A truly committed self-autonomy justification 
for the First Amendment should care little for the distinction 
between content-based and content-neutral restrictions.153 If an 
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 149. Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 
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 153. See Williams, supra note 149, at 267 (explaining that while the content 
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expressive act is suppressed by government action, the “loss of self-
fulfillment is precisely the same” whether the suppression is 
content-based or not; thus, the “government’s motivation for 
regulating speech is irrelevant to the self-realization value of the 
First Amendment.”154 If a particular kind of conduct, time, or place 
is an essential or necessary concomitant to a speaker’s chosen 
expressive act, then self-autonomy is offended when that conduct 
is punished by the government, whether the motivation for the 
punishment is content-based or not. 
A First Amendment driven by self-autonomy theory and by 
freedom of choice should protect not merely the act of speaking or 
the message contained in that speech. It should also protect the 
form that the speaker chose that speech to take.155 Even if 
alternative means might have been open to the speaker—and to be 
sure, as discussed infra, one could always hypothesize some other 
means to communicate a given message—she should be “presumed 
to have chosen the most effective means available.”156 As Martin 
Redish has noted, “the chosen ‘manner’ of expression often makes 
the substance of the message more powerful.”157 This is so in both 
symbolic speech cases and in time, place, and manner cases.  
Take the example of protesting homelessness. In 1982, 
advocates decided that the most powerful means to express their 
view that the federal government paid insufficient attention to “the 
plight of homeless people” was to “re-enact the central reality of 
homelessness” by sleeping overnight outdoors during “the dead of 
winter” in Lafayette Park, located directly across from the White 
House.158 The symbolic significance of this communicative act was 
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obvious. The Park has been a gathering place for protestors and 
demonstrators for decades,159 and according to the advocates, 
placing a symbol of powerlessness at the very seat of power would 
give the protest particular expressive force.160 Indeed, the National 
Mall, of which the Park is a part, had been host to what one might 
call “expressive sleeping” earlier that same year, for approximately 
1,000 Vietnam veterans who sought to reenact conditions at U.S. 
military encampments in Vietnam.161  
Whether one agrees with the salience of these expressive 
choices should, in the eyes of a self-autonomy-protecting First 
Amendment, be irrelevant. What is important is that the speakers 
themselves believed them to go to the core of their expressive act. 
And whether or not an uninvested court can conceive of other ways 
that the message in question can be communicated should be 
doubly irrelevant. 
Most importantly, there is also the issue of institutional 
competence. In order to consider alternative channels, a reviewing 
court must formulate them.162 Judges are a homogeneous lot, with 
“vested interests in maintaining many elements of the existing 
social and political order that has placed them in positions of 
authority.”163 Systematic biases in favor of “restraint and order”164 
will result in courts ratifying alternative channels of their own 
design (or suggested in government briefs) that will inevitably be 
more tradition-based, Establishment-respecting, and less 
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societally disruptive—and thus contain less persuasive force—
than the channel the speaker chose.165  
Of course, self-autonomy in the First Amendment context is 
really autonomy within limits. An analysis granting complete 
deference to what the speaker herself viewed as the most effective 
mode of communication, or the best time or place to communicate 
her speech, would ratify an absolutist view of the Amendment that 
the Court has never adopted. And an unqualified commitment to 
speaker autonomy would grant speakers the ability to claim that 
any alternative to the mode the speaker chose was by definition 
inadequate, on the simple ground that it was not the mode chosen. 
A legal principle based on a completely subjective measure is of no 
use—indeed, it is not “law” at all. But in those cases where the line 
between medium and message is difficult to discern, the speaker’s 
value judgments in choosing a particular mode of speech, though 
subjective, deserve a greater modicum of respect than ample 
alternative channels analysis currently provides.166  
Issues arouse passion, and passion informs speech. Courts, by 
contrast, are, by design and as a matter of cultural determinism, 
dispassionate bodies.167 One might be hard-pressed to conceive of 
someone less likely to burn a draft card than the boarding school-
sired, grandson-of-a-Supreme-Court-Justice, Air Force-serving, 
Princeton Ivy Club-dining, Prohibition laws-enforcing John 
Marshall Harlan II. And yet it is Harlan, and not O’Brien, who is 
empowered to determine whether or not burning a copy of a draft 
card speaks with the same force as burning the draft card itself.168 
If self-autonomy theory has any value and the First Amendment is 
                                                                                                     
 165. See BAKER, supra note 147, at 134 (positing that the problem with the 
majority decision-making is that it allows maintenance of a status quo at times 
when society in fact needs to be presented with behavior some may find offensive, 
to affect social change). 
 166. See id. at 178 (arguing that because the time and place of certain forms 
of speech is so integral to the intended message of the speech, the alternative 
channels analysis is inadequate to protect the speech as the speaker intended it). 
 167. See Jesse M. Barrett, Note, Legislative History, the Neutral, 
Dispassionate Judge, Legislative Supremacy: Preserving the Latter Ideals with the 
Former Tool, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 819, 819–820 (1998) (“[T]he notion that an 
adjudicator should treat pronouncements . . . with a removed neutrality is deeply 
embedded in the structure of the American . . . judicial tradition.”). 
 168. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 388–389 (1968) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
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intended to protect O’Brien’s dignity of choice, this is an 
incongruous result. 
Alternative channels analysis thus deprives the party who 
cares most about what she says of the choice of how she says it. At 
the same time, it favors uninvested courts’ value judgments over 
how that speaker should have communicated her message. Self-
autonomy theory and the values of liberty and choice that we 
collectively acknowledge inform the freedom of expression should 
not countenance such a process. But alternative channels analysis 
not only countenances that process, it compels it.   
2. Marketplace Theory 
As Brandeis’s Whitney opinion affirms, self-autonomy goes 
hand-in-hand with self-determination and self-governance.169 
Sovereignty of government is illegitimate without the sovereignty 
of its domiciliaries.170 Underlying the marketplace of ideas theory 
of the First Amendment is the assumption that individuals rely 
upon information obtained in the marketplace to choose the 
policies that will govern them.171 It follows that the greater the 
number of viewpoints upon which those policies rely, the better the 
policies, and in turn the greater self-realization that individuals 
can achieve living in a society governed by those policies.172 This is 
the great virtuous circle of free expression.  
                                                                                                     
 169. See Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(“The right of free speech, the right to teach and the right of assembly are, of 
course, fundamental rights.”). 
 170. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 318–330 (Peter Laslett 
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (asserting that the civil state only exists 
because the people have exchanged some of their natural rights for an executive 
power to protect their property and liberties and without this consent there is no 
authority). 
 171. See Paul H. Brietzke, How and Why the Marketplace of Ideas Fails, 31 
VAL. U.L. REV. 951, 955 (1997) (discussing that the marketplace of ideas theory is 
dependent on a government serving “an informed electorate,” but that this 
assumption may not be valid). 
 172. See STEVEN J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH & HUMAN DIGNITY 41 (2008) 
(“[H]uman beings exercise their capacity for self-determination not only 
individually, but also collectively, when they engage in decision making on 
matters regarding their human common life.”). 
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It is curious, then, that much of First Amendment scholarship 
undertakes as its primary task the decoupling of self-autonomy 
theory from marketplace theory, and then arguing over which 
supplies a better justification for supporting the freedom of 
speech.173 Fortunately, this project of forced divorce has little 
bearing on the claims made here. Ample alternative channels 
analysis is an equal opportunity offender with respect to both self-
autonomy and marketplace theory. It is inconsistent with both 
rationales. 
Marketplace theory defines the First Amendment’s primary 
function as facilitating a process by which truth can be reached.174 
Long the dominant theory of the First Amendment “both 
rhetorically and conceptually,”175 marketplace theory’s seeds are in 
John Milton’s Aeropagitica176 and John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty,177 
both of which argued that the only legitimate test of an idea is 
                                                                                                     
 173. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 149, at 6–24, 89–91 (detailing one 
perspective on this debate); HEYMAN, supra note 174, at 66–67, 173–74 (same); 
Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness, supra note 26, at 938 (same); Lucas A. Powe, 
Jr., Mass Speech and the Newer First Amendment, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 243, 255 
n.59 (1982) (rejecting “attempt[s] to compress the purposes of the First 
Amendment from assisting self-government and promoting individual autonomy 
into a single purpose”); see also Lawrence Alexander & Paul Horton, The 
Impossibility of a Free Speech Principle, 78 NW. U.L. REV. 1319, 1354 (1983) 
(advocating for a theory of free speech that offers approaches to the doctrines of 
“regulation of communicative impact,” “regulation of noncommunicative impact,” 
“government as communicator,” “diversity of communication,” and “form and 
procedure of regulation”); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A 
Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (1984) [hereinafter Ingber, The 
Marketplace of Ideas] (“Courts usually [justify] ‘individual rights’ because of the 
protection they afford to the person . . . . But courts that invoke the marketplace 
model of the first amendment justify free expression because of the aggregate 
benefits to society . . . not because an individual speaker receives a particular 
benefit.”); Tona Trollinger, Reconceptualizing the Free Speech Clause: From a 
Refuse of Dualism to the Reason of Holism, 3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 137, 140 
(1994) (“The assumption and exaltation of competition as an epistemological 
premise is paradoxical and counterintuitive.”). 
 174. See Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness, supra note 26, at 944 (“The 
marketplace of ideas theory—the view that wise counsels will prevail over false 
ones in the clash of free public debate and “that the best test of truth is the power 
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. . . .”). 
 175. BAKER, supra note 147, at 12. 
 176. See generally JOHN MILTON, AEROPAGITICA—A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY 
OF UNLICENSED PRINTING (1644). 
 177. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859). 
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debate with other competing ideas.178 A judgment by the majority 
that a particular idea is not worthy of protection, as manifested in 
legislation infringing the speech expressing that idea, undermines 
the functioning of the test for truth.179 This is not merely because 
that judgment disrespects the dignity of the speaker seeking to 
enter the debate, as discussed above. Government restrictions on 
speech deprive the market of ideas, and those ideas that survive a 
market with less competition can be assumed to be further from 
the truth than would be the case in the absence of such 
restrictions.180 The government’s role is thus to establish the 
conditions for a properly functioning market by restricting as little 
speech as possible. The “shared understandings of such matters as 
justice and the common good, which constitute the object of truth” 
in marketplace theory, are accordingly more legitimate if the 
government does not suppress speech.181 
The imagery of the ideas marketplace pervades First 
Amendment judicial opinions, and its precepts underlie nearly 
every test devised by the Supreme Court in the area. Justice 
Holmes’s “clear and present danger” test was justified on the 
ground that the “best test of truth is the power of [a] thought to get 
itself accepted in the competition of the market.”182 Justice 
Brennan’s constitutionalizing of state defamation law as applied to 
                                                                                                     
 178. See id. at 89 (describing the importance of the exchange of truths as a 
test of finding the “whole truth,” which is often shared between conflicting 
doctrines); MILTON, supra note 178 at 167  
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the 
earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and 
prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; 
who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter. 
 179. See MILL, ON LIBERTY at 100 
Not the violent conflict between parts of the truth, but the quiet 
suppression of half of it, is the formidable evil: there is always hope 
when people are forced to listen to both sides; it is when they attend 
only to one that errors harden into prejudices, and truth itself ceases 
to have the effect of truth . . . . 
 180. See Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas, supra note 173, at 6 (explaining 
the underlying rationales of marketplace theory, one of which is that to find the 
truth any inhibition on the marketplace is detrimental as it hinders society’s 
ability to arrive at a truth that is anything other than “dogma and prejudice”). 
 181. HEYMAN, supra note 172, at 65. 
 182. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
1698 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1657 (2016) 
public officials in New York Times v. Sullivan was intended to 
ensure “unfettered exchange of ideas” and the necessary “collision” 
between truth and error in public debate.183 The entire corpus of 
First Amendment law relies to some degree on the notion that the 
Speech and Press Clauses were intended to protect a process by 
which ideas would compete against each other for acceptance.184 If 
that process functions properly, the best of those ideas would 
necessarily win out.  
A process-based definition of marketplace theory 
predominates in First Amendment scholarship as well. As 
Frederick Schauer argues, marketplace theory “defin[es] truth as 
that which survives the process of open discussion.”185 Under 
Schauer’s conception, “there is no test of truth” in marketplace 
theory “other than the process by which opinions are accepted or 
rejected.”186 Unlike self-autonomy theory, which as discussed 
focuses on the benefits that free expression accrues upon the 
speaker, marketplace theory is listener-based in its orientation; it 
is listeners who are witnesses to the truth-finding function taking 
place within the marketplace of ideas and listeners who will 
operationalize that truth through collective adoption of the 
“wisest” governmental laws and policies.187 And the wisdom of 
those laws can be presumed only if listeners have obtained the 
information necessary to decide upon them, without government 
interference.188 Under a process-based First Amendment, “the 
                                                                                                     
 183. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (citing Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
 184. See SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH, supra note 143, at 15 (“[T]his theme [of 
marketplace theory] has surfaced in the judicial and extrajudicial writings of 
those American judges who have been most influential in molding the theoretical 
foundations of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.”). 
 185. Id. at 19–20.  
 186. Id. at 20. 
 187. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (internal 
citation omitted); see ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO 
SELF-GOVERNMENT 25 (1948) (“In that method of political self-government, the 
point of ultimate interest is not the words of the speakers, but the minds of the 
hearers.”); see also BAKER, supra note 147, at 197 (“The ultimate purpose of 
protection under this view is to guarantee a proper distribution of the product, 
speech, to the consumer, a listener or reader.”); SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH, supra 
note 143, at 42 (“[F]reedom of speech is valuable because it allows listeners to 
receive all information material to the exercise of voting rights . . . .”). 
 188. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010) (“By suppressing 
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substantive results” of the speech market “are correct because of 
the purity of the process from which they emerge.”189 
Superficially, marketplace theory’s process-based nature does 
not challenge the underpinnings of ample alternatives analysis.190 
Marketplace theory seems much more incompatible with content-
based restrictions than content-neutral ones.191 As Justice 
Marshall wrote in Police Department v. Mosley, “content control” is 
at the “essence” of the First Amendment’s intended protections, 
because restrictions on content “would completely undercut the 
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open.”192 
Content-based restrictions serve a market-distorting function, as 
they “raise the specter that the Government may effectively drive 
certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.”193 When that 
happens, government, in the words of Alexander Meiklejohn, 
“mutilat[es] the thinking process of the community” by favoring 
one side of public debate.194 
                                                                                                     
the speech of manifold corporations, both for-profit and nonprofit, the 
Government prevents their voices and viewpoints from reaching the public and 
advising voters on which persons or entities are hostile to their interests.”).  
 189. Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of 
Speech and Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 941 (1993). The process-
based conception of marketplace theory has not escaped scholarly critique. See, 
e.g., Alexander Tsesis, Balancing Free Speech, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2016)  (arguing 
that marketplace theory’s focus on truth is under-inclusive with respect to several 
types of speech that the First Amendment protects). 
 190. See BAKER, supra note 147, at 153 (“An assembly’s capacity to do 
things . . . does not fit will into a theory of first amendment rights centered on 
dialogue and rational persuasion.”). 
 191. See Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content 
Approach to Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 
1357 (2006) [hereinafter McDonald, Speech and Distrust] (“[A] seemingly absolute 
rule of content neutrality . . . was necessary . . . to protect the right of people to be 
free from government censorship of thoughts, as well as the nation's commitment 
to a free marketplace of public debate.”). 
 192. Police Dep’t of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (citing 
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 270 (1964)). 
 193. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 
502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991). But see Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 
U.S. 750, 760–61 (1988) (“[L]aws of general application that are not aimed at 
conduct commonly associated with expression . . . carry with them little danger of 
censorship.”). 
 194. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 187, at 25. 
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“In contrast,” the Court has stated, “regulations that are 
unrelated to the content of speech . . . in most cases pose a less 
substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the 
public dialogue.”195 The state has caused no substantive harm to 
the message by requiring it to be communicated via a different 
form, because the speaker’s message remains able, due to the 
availability of an alternative channel, to be subjected to the truth-
making process just described.196 Accordingly, if a message does 
not survive in the speech and ideas market, it is not because of any 
government-imposed restrictions on its channel.197 Rather, it is 
because the message, having been subjected to the test of process, 
failed to obtain a sufficient consensus in the market to survive into 
truth.198 Unless a speech restriction is content-based, in other 
words, the market is not deprived of the restricted idea, and the 
truth-seeking process can continue unabated.199 
Dig more deeply, however, and it becomes clear that applying 
marketplace theory’s frame to alternative channels analysis raises 
an ordering problem. As noted, the effect of permitting a 
government’s content-neutral restriction is to deprive the speaker 
of her chosen mode of communication.200 The result of that 
restriction is that the speaker’s message is never subjected to the 
truth process at all.201 In other words, it is the government’s 
                                                                                                     
 195. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).   
 196. See BAKER, supra note 147, at 132 (“The issue is only whether the 
restriction limits the effective operation of the marketplace of ideas. So long as 
the system allows ‘everything worth saying [to] be said,’ speech is adequately 
protected.”). 
 197. See id. at 131–34 (explaining that time, place, and manner restrictions, 
while burdensome, do not undercut the ability of ideas to compete for truth in 
marketplace theory). 
 198. See id. at 4 (explaining that marketplace theory argues that totally false 
assertions, “which could not survive open discussion,” will be “driven 
underground”). 
 199. See McDonald, Speech and Distrust, supra note 191, at 1385 (explaining 
that content based restrictions would impair the truth-seeking function of the 
marketplace of ideas). 
 200. See supra Part III.A (discussing the conflict with the theory). 
 201. See McDonald, Speech and Distrust, supra note 191, at 1385 (“There is 
little doubt that an absolute ban, or a broad restriction, on expressing or 
communicating particular information, ideas, or beliefs, would run a high risk of 
impairing the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas, inhibiting the 
free flow of information necessary for citizens to make informed decisions . . . .”). 
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restriction, not the test of process, which has decided the message’s 
fate. It is thus inaccurate to claim that the suppressed idea in 
question will rise or fall in the “market for the trade in ideas” 
despite the restriction.202 Because the restriction in question is 
speech-interfering, it has removed the expression from the market 
and from the testing presented by other competing ideas.203 And 
more importantly, once the restriction is upheld, the speech’s 
opportunity to survive or not in the relevant marketplace of ideas 
via the alternative channel has passed.204 Accordingly, the 
presence of a substitute at the time of the restricted speech is, as 
to the marketplace question, at that point moot. 
The Ninth Circuit demonstrated this ordering problem in 
2005’s Menotti v. City of Seattle.205 In Menotti, individuals 
protesting at the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 1999 
conference in Seattle were arrested for violating an emergency 
order that prohibited public access to parts of downtown Seattle 
where the conference was taking place.206 Prior to the order and 
arrests at issue, a small minority of “violent protestors held, 
pushed, or tackled WTO delegates to prevent their entry into 
conference venues.”207 In light of that activity, the mayor of Seattle 
issued an emergency order that prohibited entry into twenty-five 
square blocks of downtown Seattle to all except WTO-related 
delegates and employees, employees of businesses within the 
restricted area, and law enforcement and public safety 
personnel.208 The arrested protestors brought First Amendment-
based claims to the emergency order and their arrests, but the 
                                                                                                     
 202. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH, supra note 143, at 16.  
 203. See HEYMAN, supra note 174, at 26 (arguing that the best test of truth is 
the power of market competition, and a restriction on the content takes away from 
the truth of the idea). 
 204. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 334 (2010) (“There are short 
timeframes in which speech can have influence . . . . A speaker's ability to 
engage . . . is stifled if the speaker must first commence a protracted lawsuit.”). 
 205. 409 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 206. See id. at 1120–25 (explaining that the plaintiffs were arrested in 
relation to protests, some of which had elements of violence, that took place before 
and during the WTO conference). 
 207. Id. at 1123. 
 208. See id. at 1125 (citing the Mayor’s emergency order, which created a 
curfew in limited parts of the city and authorized the police to take 
“extraordinary” measures to curb the violent protests). 
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Ninth Circuit rejected them.209 As to ample alternative channels, 
the court acknowledged that “the application of these principles 
presents a very difficult question,”210 but in the end held that the 
emergency order still “allowed protestors to demonstrate directly 
across the street” from various WTO venues and most of the hotels 
hosting WTO delegates, and there was no evidence indicating that 
those locations were not within sight of the delegates.211 Upon the 
court’s identification of an alternative channel, both the emergency 
order and the prosecutions for violating it survived intermediate 
scrutiny.212 
Given the violence surrounding WTO-related meetings at the 
time of Menotti, it is difficult to cast much doubt on the 
substantiality of the City of Seattle’s interest in adopting the 
emergency order at issue. But the availability of ample 
alternatives should be a separate question. And it is difficult to see 
how the reasoning and result in the Menotti case jibe with 
marketplace theory. As an initial matter, the protest zone upheld 
by the majority in Menotti unquestionably limited the barred 
speakers from reaching the speech marketplace of their choice—
those individuals the protestors most sought to persuade, i.e., the 
WTO delegates themselves, as well as others closely following the 
conference. Without access to the downtown area, the effectiveness 
of the protestors’ speech, and by extension the ability for that 
speech to be tested by other truths, was crippled.213 And the 
alternative deemed sufficient by the majority, the boundaries 
outside the restricted zone and the area extending outward from 
there, divested the protestors’ speech of its intended reach.214 In 
other words, the market that should matter most—that market 
                                                                                                     
 209. See id. at 1118 (“We determine that the emergency order was a 
constitutional time, place, and manner restriction on speech on its face, and we 
affirm the judgment of the district court on that issue.”). 
 210. Id. at 1138. 
 211. Id. at 1141. 
 212. See id. at 1138–43 (applying a standard of intermediate scrutiny and 
determining that the order and prosecutions for violating it did not violate the 
First Amendment because ample alternative channels were available). 
 213. See id. at 1126 (“Chief Stamper testified in deposition that the effect of 
the Operations Order was to exclude protestors from entering the restricted 
zone.”). 
 214. Id. at 1138–41. 
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that the speakers most desired to reach—is the one that is 
deprived by the restriction in question. 
Furthermore, in order to fit ample alternatives analysis within 
marketplace theory, courts must engage in counterfactual 
speculation with respect to what the speaker could have done at 
the time of the restricted speech, but did not. It makes little sense 
to find that an alternative mode of communication was available 
to a speaker and thus that the marketplace of ideas was not 
significantly divested of the restricted speech, well after the 
speaker has already been deprived of the opportunity to speak.215 
For example, as noted above, the court decided that protestors 
could have expressed themselves outside the borders of the 
restricted area and still reached their audience—hence the court’s 
emphasis on whether WTO delegates could hear and see the 
protestors from the location that the regulations forced them to 
use.216 But it did so six years after the fact, when the attention, let 
alone the physical presence, of both the protestors and their 
intended audiences have long departed from the city of Seattle.217 
It does neither the speaker nor the market any good to find that 
an alternative could have permitted the speech to reach the market 
well after the speaker could have theoretically taken advantage of 
that alternative.  
To be sure, courts analyzing content-neutral restrictions are 
occasionally sensitive to these concerns when considering the 
existence of alternative channels. But this is only in cases when 
courts give proper deference to the speaker’s intent with respect to 
the intended market for her speech. For instance, take the facts of 
Edwards v. City of Coeur d’Alene,218 another Ninth Circuit case 
decided just four years before Menotti. There, petitioner Edwards 
was arrested while protesting a downtown march being conducted 
                                                                                                     
 215. In theory, the speaker might be able to successfully enjoin the content-
neutral restriction in question and thus be able to use her preferred mode of 
speech. But in cases such as Menotti where the speaker’s audience is limited in 
time to a particular event, emergency injunctive relief will likely be unavailable. 
 216. See Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1141 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that Order No. 3 provided “ample alternative channels of 
communication” to protestors). 
 217. See id. at 1120 (stating that the events giving rise the case occurred in 
1999). 
 218. 262 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2001).  
1704 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1657 (2016) 
by the Aryan Nation.219 Edwards’s sign said “Stop the Nazis 
Now.”220 Edwards was arrested not for the content of his message, 
however, but rather for its wooden handle and slat supports, which 
violated a Coeur d’Alene ordinance that made illegal the use of 
signs “affixed to any wooden, plastic, or other type of support” 
during parades and public assemblies.221  
The Ninth Circuit struck down the ordinance.222 It found that 
the City’s proffered alternative means such as “hand[ing] out 
leaflets, carr[ying] signs without supports and made of non-rigid 
materials, sing[ing], shout[ing], perform[ing] dramatic 
presentations,” or “solicit[ing] signatures for petitions and 
appeal[ing] to passersby” did not permit Edwards to “reach the 
minds of willing listeners and . . . win their attention” with force 
equal to the means he chose, because those methods would not 
permit his message to be visible during the parade.223 In other 
words, to the Edwards court, the relevant speech market for 
Edwards’s counterspeech was the audience assembled at the 
Aryan Nations parade; depriving the speaker access to that 
audience deprived the marketplace of ideas.224 The court thus 
affirmed Edwards’s choice to use a larger sign that he could hold 
high above his head, but this was only after it became self-evident 
that a smaller, less sturdily supported one would go unseen at the 
parade.225 If the court had deemed these smaller signs to be 
                                                                                                     
 219. Id. at 859. 
 220. Id.  
 221. Id. at 859–60. 
 222. Id. at 867. 
 223. Id. at 867; see also Turner v. Plafond, No. C 09-683 MHP, 2011 WL 
62220, at *11 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (noting the “unique locale” of the speaker’s desired 
audience). 
 224. See Edwards v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 262 F.3d 856, 864 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(finding that the protestor’s intended audience was the pedestrians at the 
parade). 
 225. See id. 
Signs attached to supports such as poles or sticks are effective tools by 
which to overcome the communication problems endemic to [parades]. 
A sign that can be hoisted high in the air projects a message above the 
heads of the crowd to reach spectators, passersby, and television 
cameras . . . . [T]here is no other effective and economical way for an 
individual to communicate his or her message to a broad audience 
during a parade or public assembly than to attach a handle to his sign 
to hoist it high in the air. 
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adequate substitutes—and, had it applied the logic used in 
Menotti, it certainly would have—Edwards would not have had the 
opportunity to speak lawfully at all.  
It is a weak defense of a legal doctrine to claim that the 
doctrine works when it does, and does not work when it doesn’t. 
Ample alternative channels respects marketplace theory in those 
cases where alternatives are found to be poor substitutes, but 
disrespects marketplace theory in those cases where alternatives 
are found to be proper substitutes. This demonstrates a problem 
with the doctrine itself, not merely its application. And surveying 
its application across different types of cases reveals additional 
flaws. 
B. Conflict Within Case Law 
As Menotti and Edwards show, a meaningful application of the 
ample alternative channels prong of content-neutral intermediate 
scrutiny should consider not just other legal and available means 
of communications, but closely compare the effectiveness of those 
means to the one the speaker chose.226 As the cases also show, 
however, the rigor with which courts approach this inquiry is 
intermittent at best. 
But even a careful application of ample alternative channels 
analysis that keeps the speaker’s intended audience close in mind 
does First Amendment doctrine a disservice. The test’s application 
in particular cases has led to speaker-averse results.227 This 
Section catalogs some of the various types of cases in which 
appellate courts apply ample alternative channels analysis—in 
“free speech zone” cases, in which protestors or other speakers are 
corralled into specific areas of public space; in adult theater and 
                                                                                                     
 226. See, e.g., Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029, 1041–42 (7th Cir. 
2002) (finding no alternatives available to an author who had self-published a 
book critical of Chicago Blackhawks owner when the author was barred by city’s 
peddling ordinance from selling book outside the arena where Blackhawks 
played); Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir. 
1990) (“An alternative is not ample if the speaker is not permitted to reach the 
‘intended audience.’”).  
 227. See Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1140 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(rejecting the argument that the specific place of protest was essential to 
communicating the protesters’ desired message). 
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bookstore cases, in which courts find that restricting the hours or 
location of such businesses is permissible so long as the speech is 
available in other places or at other times; in “prohibited means” 
cases, in which a particular mode of expression or mode of 
communicating it is barred; and in abortion protest cases, which 
combine principles of the “free speech zone” and “prohibited 
means” cases to uphold nominally content-neutral restrictions on 
protest activity near abortion clinics. A survey of these cases 
demonstrates that applying ample alternative channels analysis 
injects an unacceptable degree of caprice in an area where First 
Amendment law should provide clarity and predictability for both 
speakers and governments.   
1. The “Free Speech Zone” Cases 
The Ninth Circuit’s Menotti and Edwards cases demonstrate 
the inconsistent application of ample alternative channels in the 
public protest context.228 In the former case, excluding protestors 
from the locations hosting the event that was the subject of their 
protest was permissible, even though those locations found to be 
adequate substitutes separated the protestors from their intended 
audience.229 In the latter case, preventing a protestor from using 
his chosen means of communication, a large sign supported by a 
wooden handle and slats, was impermissible, because the 
alternative means that were permissible for the protestor to use—
leaflets, or signs that could not be lifted as high without wooden 
supports—would not have been effective in reaching his intended 
audience as the one he chose.230 Unfortunately, the Edwards 
approach has proven to be an outlier. Other cases involving 
government efforts to restrict protest activity in public spaces 
                                                                                                     
 228. Id. at 1113; Edwards, 262 F.3d at 856. 
 229. See Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1138 (“Given the protestors' ability to 
communicate directly across the street from most WTO venues . . . we think the 
better analysis favors the conclusion that Order No. 3 provided ample 
alternatives for communication.”). 
 230. See Edwards v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 262 F.3d 856, 867 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“[The] ban on sign supports is an invalid time, place, and manner restriction on 
speech because it is not narrowly tailored to serve the City's interest in public 
safety and it fails to leave open ample, alternative channels of communication to 
picketers.”). 
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demonstrate that ample alternative channels analysis drives First 
Amendment doctrine in speech-averse directions. 
For example, take 2004’s Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. City of 
Boston.231 There, Boston, like the city of Seattle in Menotti, limited 
protests around the Fleet Center, where the 2004 Democratic 
National Convention was being held, to a designated 
“demonstration zone,” which was well outside of the area 
immediately surrounding the Center.232 The demonstration zone 
was encircled by barriers topped by eight foot-tall chain-link 
fencing and semitransparent mesh fabric.233 It was undisputed 
that the demonstration zone “allowed no opportunity for physical 
interaction (such as the distribution of leaflets) and severely 
curtailed any chance for one-to-one conversation,” and even the use 
of signs there “was hampered to some extent by the cramped space 
and the mesh screening” around the zone’s perimeter.234 In fact, 
the demonstration zone cut off protestors from their intended 
audiences to such a degree that no protestor decided to use it 
during the Convention.235 
However, the First Circuit held that these restrictions did not 
violate the First Amendment.236 On the ample alternative 
channels issue, the court found that the speakers challenging 
alternatives to the demonstration zone as inadequate because they 
were not “within sight and sound of the delegates”—again, a deal-
breaker for the speakers themselves, who chose not to use the zone 
at all because of that fact—“greatly underestimate[] the nature of 
                                                                                                     
 231. 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004). 
  232. See id. at 10 (describing security measures taken in light of heightened 
sensitivity due to security concerns following the terrorist attacks of September 
11). 
 233. See id. (describing the demonstration zone). 
 234. Id. at 13. 
 235. See Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 581, 595 
n.80 (2006) (“The designated demonstration area, a dank place under abandoned 
elevated tracks, failed its first test . . . when what will probably be the largest 
demonstration of the convention period simply walked by it.” (citing John Kifner, 
Demonstrators Steer Clear of Their Designated Space, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2004, 
at P3)). 
 236. See Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y, 378 F.3d at 14 (upholding the district court’s 
determinations that the security measures undertaken by the City were narrowly 
tailored). 
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modern communications,” find that “[a]t a high-profile event, such 
as the Convention, messages expressed beyond the first-hand sight 
and sound of the delegates nonetheless have a propensity to reach 
the delegates through television, radio, the press, the Internet, and 
other outlets.”237 
As discussed in detail below, taking modern communications 
technologies into account as part of ample alternatives analysis 
means that nearly any content-neutral restriction imaginable will 
survive constitutional scrutiny.238 But pause here for a moment to 
consider what the First Circuit held. It does not violate the First 
Amendment to ban protestors from the area around a site hosting 
an event they wish to protest, because those protestors can speak 
their grievances to the general public by doing interviews with 
mainstream media and setting up websites.239 Any conception of 
the First Amendment that recognizes speech and place as linked, 
or that gives the speaker’s views precedence as to the proper 
audience for speech or the best way to reach it, has been discarded. 
This is a diminished Speech Clause.240 
Similarly, in Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado 
Springs,241 a group of demonstrators whose concern was with “the 
militarization of space and the prevention of war” intended to 
protest a Department of Defense-sponsored conference of foreign 
defense ministers at a hotel and convention center in Colorado 
Springs.242 For security reasons, public streets and sidewalks 
around the hotel were closed off.243 The demonstrators requested 
                                                                                                     
 237. Id. Other courts considering similar challenges have reached the same 
conclusion. See Coalition to March on the RNC and Stop the War v. City of St. 
Paul, Minn., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1028–31 (D. Minn. 2008) (relying on Bl(a)ck 
Tea Society for the proposition that ample alternatives existed for protestors who 
could not march near convention site, because protestors could access members 
of the media). 
 238. Infra Part III.C. 
 239. See Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(applying ample alternative channels analysis). 
 240. Also, news coverage will always depend on the media’s determination of 
newsworthiness; the agency in such a communicative act’s reaching its intended 
audience is the journalist’s, not the speaker’s.  
 241. 477 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 242. See id. at 1218 (“Specifically, the Citizens hoped to conduct their protest 
on a sidewalk across from the International Conference Center.”).  
 243. See id. at 1217 (“The security plan for the conference included closing 
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access to those sidewalks in order to undertake a peaceful 
six-person protest.244 They were denied access, but were granted 
permission to demonstrate outside of a checkpoint several blocks 
away through which conference delegates and the international 
media would enter the conference—a point at which the delegates 
and media “could only observe the protest briefly as their vehicles 
passed by.”245 Furthermore, there was no dispute that the 
protestors outside the checkpoint were not within the line of sight 
of the hotel hosting the conference.246 Despite those facts, the 
Tenth Circuit held that the checkpoint protest provided an 
alternative to the protest inside the security zone.247 Among other 
reasons, the court found that local media had interviewed the 
protestors during the meeting, and thus barring them from the 
conference area did not materially infringe on their rights to access 
their intended audience.248 
One reading of these cases suggests that they do not damn 
ample alternative channels analysis altogether; rather, they only 
call for a more “intended audience”-focused application of the 
analysis as laid out supra and as demonstrated in the Ninth 
Circuit’s Edwards case. But Bl(a)ck Tea Society and Citizens for 
Peace are wrong not simply because they fail to consider the 
speakers’ intended audience. Rather, they focus on that audience 
at the expense of the mode by which the speakers chose to 
communicate with it.249  
                                                                                                     
public streets and sidewalks and imposing a large ‘limited access area’ or ‘security 
zone.’”). 
 244. See id. at 1218 (“[T]he proposed protest would involve six persons who 
hold banners on a sidewalk across the street from the International Conference 
Center.”). 
 245. Id. at 1218. 
 246. See id. at 1218–19 (“There was no direct line of sight between the protest 
location and the International Conference Center, and the Citizens could barely 
be seen, if at all, from the Broadmoor itself.”). 
 247. See Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado Springs, 477 F.3d 
1212, 1226 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[P]rotesting on the periphery of the security zone 
allowed the Citizens to present their views to the conference delegates and 
international media. They were not wholly cut off from their intended audience, 
such that there were no ample alternatives to a protests within the security zone 
itself.”). 
 248. See id. at 1226 (indicating that the Citizens were interviewed on October 
7 and October 8). 
 249. See Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2004) 
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In both cases, the reviewing courts minimized the protestors’ 
interest in “close, physical interaction” with their intended 
audiences as a necessary concomitant to the message being 
conveyed.250 Once the courts credited the government’s security 
interest in establishing the speech zones at issue, any expressive 
conduct that contemplated contemporaneous dialogue between the 
speakers and their audiences, including not only one-on-one 
discussions and leafleting but also the use of signs or other visual 
media or location-specific symbolic conduct, was immediately 
disfavored.251 The courts then began looking for other ways the 
speakers could communicate their protests. In other words, ample 
alternative channels analysis provided a method courts in these 
and similar cases could use to minimize the demonstration zones’ 
impact on the protestors’ expressive rights.252 Once a court decides 
that an intended audience could have been reached in some other 
way, the weight of the intended mode the speaker chose to reach 
that audience is drastically minimized in the First Amendment 
balancing.253 It is Justice Harlan in O’Brien all over again. 
Additionally, as these cases also show, the most troubling 
aspect of the free speech zone cases is the manner in which 
alternative channels analysis completely overtakes forum 
doctrine. The primary justification for protecting a public forum is 
to ensure that a speaker may reach her intended audience without 
                                                                                                     
(“[T]he direct limits on aural communication seem minor, even this form of 
interaction may have been less effective because of the restrictions on other modes 
of expression.”). 
 250. Citizens for Peace in Space, 477 F.3d at 1225. 
 251. See Am. Civil Liberties Union of Colo. v. City of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 
1142, 1182 (D. Col. 2008) (“In essence, the Plaintiffs argue that their message 
consists of not just its content but also the location in which it was delivered.”). 
 252. See id. at 1166 (listing as examples of alternative channels “the ability 
to speak to attendees when they board buses,” “the opportunity for any attendee 
wanting more information to return to the speakers,” and the “ability of speakers 
to reach the attendees and the public through other media channels such as 
television and print”); see also Coalition to March on the RNC and Stop the War 
v. City of St. Paul, 557 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1028–29 (D. Minn. 2008) (demonstrating 
that ample alternative channels were available to protestors who were denied a 
permit to parade around Republican National Convention site included including 
access to delegates through radio and television). 
 253. See Am. Civil Liberties Union of Colo., 569 F. Supp. 2d at 1166 (providing 
an example where the intended audience could have been reached through 
alternative means). 
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significant government interference.254 A particular forum is often 
“chosen for its significance to [the speaker’s] message.”255 In such 
cases, “the place represents the object of protest, the seat of 
authority against which the protest is directed,” as well as where 
“the relevant audience may be found.”256 But to find that speaker 
choices concerning audience and setting in public spaces can be 
overcome via a finding of ample alternative channels in other 
places is to directly undermine the reasons for affording 
government less latitude in regulating speech in public fora in the 
first place.  
2. The Adult Entertainment Cases 
Another set of cases in which a court’s finding of ample 
alternative channels proves dispositive involves adult 
entertainment theaters and bookstores. In Young v. American 
Mini Theaters, Inc.,257 the Supreme Court held that municipalities’ 
use of their zoning ordinances to combat the undesirable secondary 
effects of such businesses should be reviewed under the standard 
of review for content-neutral laws.258 Since Young, ample 
alternative channels analysis has played the critical role in 
upholding these ordinances. For instance, in City of Renton v. 
Playtime Theatres,259 the ordinance in question prohibited “adult 
motion picture theater[s] from locating within 1,000 feet of any 
residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, or 
park, and within one mile of any school.”260 Only five percent of the 
                                                                                                     
 254. See Galvin v. Hay, 374 F.3d 739, 747 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the 
propriety of a public forum is related to the relevance for the protest, either 
through a symbolic nature or for a specific intended audience). 
 255. Id. at 752. 
 256. Id. (citing Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 1968)); see 
also United States v. Griefen, 200 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 2000) (providing an 
example where demonstrators were in a northern Idaho forest to protest logging 
contracting practices of Forest Service).  
 257. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
 258. See id. at 61 (“The fact that First Amendment protects some, though not 
necessarily all, of that material from total suppression does not warrant the 
further conclusion that an exhibitor’s doubts as to whether a borderline film may 
be shown in his theater . . . .”). 
 259. 475 U.S. 41 (1988). 
 260. Id. at 44. 
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city of Renton did not fall within the ordinance’s proscriptions.261 
On that basis, however, the Court held that ample alternative 
channels existed for the respondents who sought to show adult 
films in the city.262  
Other cases involve statutory restrictions on the hours of 
operation of such businesses. Lower courts have upheld those 
restrictions on ample alternative channels grounds as well. In 
Mitchell v. Commission on Adult Entertainment Establishments,263 
for example, Delaware passed a law restricting the operating hours 
of adult entertainment businesses to 10 am to 10 pm and required 
them to close on Sundays.264 Upholding the law, the Third Circuit 
held that “adult bookstores are free to operate six days per week 
for twelve hours per day Monday through Saturday,”265 and thus 
ample alternative means for the stores and their customers were 
available.266 And the same court upheld a similar ordinance passed 
by Vineland, New Jersey, finding that “the statute allows those 
who choose to hear, view, or participate publicly in sexually explicit 
expressive activity more than thirty-six hundred hours per year to 
do so. We think the Constitution requires no more.”267  
                                                                                                     
 261. See id. at 53–54 (“[W]e note that the ordinance leaves some 520 acres, or 
more than five percent of the entire land area of Renton, open to use as adult 
theater sites.”). 
 262. See id. at 54 (“[W]e find that the Renton ordinance represents a valid 
governmental response to the ‘admittedly serious problems’ created by adult 
theaters.”). 
 263. 10 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 264. See id. at 128 (describing the “Adult Entertainment Establishments Act” 
passed by the Delaware General Assembly). 
 265. Id. at 139. 
 266. Id.  
 267. Ben Rich Trading, Inc. v. City of Vineland, 126 F.3d 155, 163 (3d Cir. 
1997) (quoting Mitchell, 10 F.3d at 139); see also Ctr. for Fair Pub. Policy v. 
Maricopa County, 336 F.3d 1153, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding a similar law 
on ample alternative means grounds); Richland Bookmart, Inc. v. Nichols, 137 
F.3d 435, 441 (6th Cir. 1998) (same); Star Satellite, Inc. v. City of Biloxi, 779 F.2d 
1074, 1079–80 (5th Cir. 1986) (same); Schultz v. City of Cumberland, 26 F. Supp. 
2d 1128, 1145–46 (W.D. Wis. 1998) (same); Lady J. Lingerie, Inc. v. City of 
Jacksonville, 973 F. Supp. 1428, 1447 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (same); Tee & Bee, Inc. v. 
City of West Allis, 936 F. Supp. 1479, 1492 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (same); Bright Lights, 
Inc. v. City of Newport, 830 F. Supp. 378, 389 (E.D. Ky. 1993) (same); Ellwest 
Stereo Theater, Inc. v. Boner, 718 F. Supp. 1553, 1577 (M.D. Tenn. 1989) (same); 
Broadway Books, Inc. v. Roberts, 642 F. Supp. 486, 493 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (same). 
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Of course, the reason ample alternative channels analysis 
applies in these cases in the first place is because of the secondary 
effects doctrine, which serves to ratchet down from strict to 
intermediate the First Amendment scrutiny applied to laws that 
facially reference content.268 Judges and scholars have criticized 
the secondary effects doctrine on the ground it “allow[s] 
communities to justify [facially] content-based laws” proscribing 
non-obscene sexual expression that, in any context other than 
pornographic speech, would be subjected to strict scrutiny.269 
Those critiques are certainly salient, but for present purposes, the 
troubling fact is that ample alternative channels analysis is 
carrying decisional weight. The cases stand for the proposition that 
some interference with protected speech is permissible on the 
ground that speech is usually accessible to those who wish to speak 
and receive it. Courts should be wary, however, of holding that 
reducing protected speech can be justified so long as the reduction 
preserves the ability to engage in that speech at another time or 
place of the government’s choosing. Indeed, this analysis is not 
even consistent with many of the other ample alternative channels 
cases, which consider actual alternatives—i.e., substitutes, as the 
theory underlying the doctrine intends—to the suppressed speech 
                                                                                                     
 268. See Ben Rich Trading, Inc. v. City of Vineland, 126 F.3d 155, 160 (3d Cir. 
1997) (“[I]f a regulation’s primary purpose is to ameliorate the socially adverse 
secondary effects of speech-related activity, the regulation is deemed content-
neutral, and is accordingly measured by intermediate scrutiny . . . .”). 
 269. David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: The Evisceration 
of First Amendment Freedoms, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 55, 66 (1997); see also City of 
Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (explaining that laws at issue in secondary effects cases are “content-
based, and we should call them so”); id. at 457 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens and 
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (“It would in fact make sense to give this kind of zoning 
regulation a First Amendment label of its own, and if we called it content 
correlated, we would not only describe it for what it is, but keep alert to a risk of 
content-based regulation that it poses.”); John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary 
Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. REV. 291, 304 (2009) (explaining that the secondary 
effects doctrine is a “fiction . . . inconsistent with the Court’s usual method of 
treating facially discriminatory regulations as content-based”); Christopher J. 
Andrew, Note, The Secondary Effects Doctrine: The Historical Development, 
Current Application, and Potential Mischaracterization of an Elusive Judicial 
Precedent, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1178 (2002) (discussing judicial review of 
content-based and content-neutral regulations). 
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in question: flyers in lieu of for sale signs,270 or anti-homelessness 
banners and “day-and-night vigils” in lieu of sleeping outside.271 
Some comfort might be taken from the fact that Young and its 
progeny have had minimal precedential value in other kinds of 
speech cases.272 Nevertheless, courts in these cases are simply 
holding that barring protected speech for one day a week is 
permissible so long as that speech is available for the other six 
days, even though under the Speech Clause, the second fact is 
irrelevant to the first.273  
3. The “Prohibited Means” Cases 
A third category of decisions using ample alternative channels 
analysis is often defended on the grounds it bars only a means of 
communication, not the communication itself. The primary 
“prohibited means” case is Members of City Council v. Taxpayers 
for Vincent,274 in which the Court held that a municipal code 
banning the posting of signs on public property was content 
neutral and thus permissible even though it barred a city council 
candidate from posting political signs on the city’s utility poles.275 
Despite the ban on using poles, the Court found that ample 
alternative means existed for the speech in question, such as 
“speak[ing] and distribut[ing] literature in the same place where 
the posting of signs on public property is prohibited.”276  
Taxpayers for Vincent has been applied in a range of lower 
court cases to uphold similar facially neutral regulations that 
                                                                                                     
 270. Cleveland Area Bd. of Realtors v. City of Euclid, 88 F.3d 382, 390 (6th 
Cir. 1996). 
 271. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984).  
 272. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Televised Violence: 
First Amendment Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REV. 1123, 1272 
(1978) (“[R]estrictive rulings by the Court in cases involving sexually related 
materials should and do have minimal precedential value when offered as 
justification for regulating other forms of speech.”). 
 273. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The loss 
of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably 
constitutes irreparable injury.”).  
 274. 466 U.S. 789 (1984). 
 275. See id. at 804 (explaining that the state may sometimes curtail speech 
when necessary to advance a significant and legitimate state interest).  
 276. Id. at 812.  
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restricted political speech. In Johnson v. City and County of 
Philadelphia,277 the Third Circuit held that an ordinance barring 
the posting on public property of political signs was constitutional 
because candidates were not entitled to their “favored or most cost-
effective mode of communication” and they were free to advertise 
with the media or to post signs on private property.278 Indeed, the 
court pointed to the fact that one of the complaining candidates 
had previously won election without violating the ordinance as 
evidence that such alternative means were as effective as the ones 
the ordinance proscribed.279  
Geoffrey Stone has argued that these prohibited means cases 
are reconcilable with the First Amendment because the “particular 
means of expression” that these speakers choose are usually not 
“distinctive,” and thus the regulations at issue permit a speaker to 
shift from the prohibited means of communication to another 
permissible one without diminution of the message itself.280 “[F]or 
the most part,” Stone claims, “the elimination of any one of these 
means of expression is unlikely to cause a significant reduction in 
the total quantity of free expression.”281 In other words, 
restrictions in the prohibited means cases limit the 
noncommunicative conduct the speaker chooses to deliver his 
                                                                                                     
 277. 665 F.3d 486, 494 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 278. See id. at 494 (“Accordingly, a speaker is not entitled to his or her favored 
or most cost-effective mode of communication. He or she must simply be afforded 
the opportunity to ‘reach the intended audience’ . . . .” (citing Startzell v. City of 
Philadelphia, 553 F.3d 183, 202 (3d Cir. 2008))). 
 279. See id. (“[I]n Johnson’s case at least, it was effective; he waged a 
successful campaign in spite of the ordinance’s restrictions, winning both the 
Democratic primary and the general election for State Representative.”). 
  280. Stone, supra note 10, at 64–65. 
 281. Id. at 65; see also Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness, supra note 24, at 
945 (“Quantity of expression is not a major concern of the marketplace of ideas 
theory.”).  
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expression—in addition to signage282, leafleting,283 solicitation,284 
public demonstrations,285 and the like—rather than speech.  
Put differently, even though the speaker is restricted, a court 
reviewing the restriction can presume she can easily shift to a 
different type of conduct to communicate her desired message. As 
Stone notes, “[a]n individual prohibited from leafleting may post 
signs; an individual prohibited from door-to-door solicitation may 
solicit on the street; an individual prohibited from using sound 
trucks may rent billboards; an individual prohibited from using 
billboards may advertise on the radio; and so on.”286 This category 
of cases sounds in the speech/conduct distinction that drives much 
of time, place, and manner doctrine; such restrictions are 
presumed valid because they are deemed to restrict conduct, not 
speech.287 
However, this line of argument proves too much. As noted 
above, Justice Harlan would certainly not have been moved around 
the time of O’Brien by an argument that a prohibited 
pamphleteer’s expressive rights are not violated because that 
pamphleteer could theoretically post a sign or rent a billboard 
displaying the content of the banned pamphlet.288 Indeed, the 
prohibited pamphleteer was the speaker whom Harlan believed 
                                                                                                     
 282. See Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 
(1984) (finding that an ordinance banning the posting on political signage was 
constitutional). 
 283. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160–61 (1939) 
(demonstrating that the prohibition of leafleting would not abridge the 
constitutional liberty because the activity bears no necessary relationship to the 
freedom to speak, write, print, or distribute information or opinion). 
 284. See Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 636–37 
(1980) (explaining that the legitimate interests of a municipality may be served 
by limiting solicitation, but in a manner that is narrowly tailored not to violate 
the First Amendment).  
 285. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 552 (1965) (reversing a conviction for 
disturbing the peace because First Amendment rights were denied).  
 286. Stone, supra note 10, at 65; see also id. at 75 (“Content-neutral 
restrictions usually limit the availability of only particular means of expression. 
They are thus unlikely substantially to block the communication of particular 
messages.”).  
 287. See Schneider, 308 U.S. at 160–61 (discussing the conduct of leafleting). 
 288. See supra Part II (explaining that Harlan believed that Chief Justice 
Warren’s argument was flawed in stating that the First Amendment protected 
non-verbal expression simply because it had a communicative nature). 
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was most threatened by Chief Justice Warren’s proposed rule of 
decision in O’Brien.289  
Furthermore, it is unresponsive to claim, as Stone does,290 that 
content-neutral regulations generally impair conduct, while 
content-based regulations, which are more “distinctive” in their 
nature, impair speech, and that in content-neutral cases, 
alternative channels can permit the same speech to be 
communicated via different conduct. As the Court has noted for 
decades, the line between speech and conduct is hardly clear. As 
Justice Scalia argued, “there comes a point . . . at which the 
regulation of action intimately and unavoidably connected with 
traditional speech is a regulation of speech itself.”291 When speech 
and action are “intimately connected,” it is no answer to claim that 
one action will do just as well as another without adversely 
affecting the speech that the action facilitates.292 Ed Baker notes 
that this is particularly so when “the intended meaning of people’s 
expression relates to the time or the place or the manner of the 
expression,” in which case “a time, place, or manner regulation 
may prohibit the substantially valued expressive activity.”293 As 
the next category of cases also demonstrates, place or manner can 
be intertwined with speech to such a degree that an interference 
with one is indistinguishable from an interference with the other. 
4. The Abortion Clinic Protest Cases 
In the quote above, Justice Scalia was writing in the context 
of abortion clinic protests, during which there should be no doubt 
as to the “intimate connection” between the “time or the place or 
the manner of the expression” and its “intended meaning.”294 In 
                                                                                                     
 289. Id.  
 290. See Stone, supra note 10, at 75 (explaining that content-neutral 
restrictions limit other means of expression). 
 291. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 745 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 292. See id. (“The strictures of the First Amendment cannot be avoided by 
regulating the act of moving one’s lips; and they cannot be avoided by regulating 
the act of extending one’s arm to deliver handbill . . . .”). 
 293. Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness, supra note 24, at 946; see also id. at 
947 (“A person may find a round-the-clock vigil is necessary to express, live, and 
implement her values.”). 
 294. Hill, 530 U.S. at 749. 
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these cases, governments place “buffer zones” around the 
entrances of health centers and clinics that provide abortions or 
“bubble zones” around the individuals entering those centers 
rather than or in addition to the clinic itself. The laws have the 
effect of physically separating speakers from their intended 
audiences, primarily women seeking consultations or medical 
procedures concerning their pregnancies.295 The question then 
becomes whether that physical separation impermissibly impedes 
on the speakers’ expression.296 And through the use of ample 
alternative channels analysis, courts consistently hold that it does 
not.  
A typical example is from Clift v. City of Burlington, 
Vermont,297 in which Burlington adopted a 35-foot radius around 
reproductive health care facilities in the city.298 Burlington’s 
ordinance decreed that “no person or persons shall knowingly 
congregate, patrol, picket, or demonstrate in the buffer zone.”299 
Individuals seeking to express their opposition to abortion outside 
Planned Parenthood’s Burlington Health Center challenged the 
ordinance on First Amendment grounds, arguing that the buffer 
zone prevented the speakers from handing flyers to those entering 
the Center and attempting to counsel them face-to-face concerning 
the abortion decision.300 Combined with traffic, construction and 
other ambient street noise, in many cases the buffer zone 
prevented the petitioners from speaking to those individuals at 
all.301 Despite these interferences with the speakers’ preferred 
                                                                                                     
 295. See id. at 789 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining the intent of the 
speakers to ask pregnant women to “contemplate the nature of the life she is 
carrying” when considering an abortion).  
 296. See id. at 738 (discussing that after weighing the government’s interest 
in protecting people from unwanted intrusion, the Court then focuses on the 
content neutrality of the regulation, the interests to be served, and the 
availability of other means of expressing the desired message). 
 297. 925 F. Supp. 2d 614 (D. Vt. 2013).  
 298. Id. at 626–27, 629–30. 
 299. Id. at 619. 
 300. See id. at 620 (“The Plaintiffs allege that the Ordinance, which came into 
effect on August 15, 2012, has severely disrupted their ability to approach, 
counsel, and distribute information to individuals approaching Planned 
Parenthood’s Burlington Health Center . . . .”).  
 301. See id. (describing the physical layout of the Planned Parenthood 
facility). 
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means of communication, however, the court found that ample 
alternative channels existed because the petitioners could hold 
signs, sing, call out to individuals entering the facility (including 
through the use of amplification equipment), and engage in silent 
and vocal prayer.302 Courts reach the same result in bubble zone 
cases. Those cases find ample alternative means for the speaker 
such as “peacefully hand[ing] leaflets” to the clinic-entering 
individual “as they pass by” without entering the bubble zone 
around that person.303 In sum, reviewing courts have consistently 
found that ample alternative means exist for a speaker who is 
barred from communicating face-to-face with abortion clinic 
clients.304  
The long procedural history of the 2013–14 Term’s McCullen 
v. Coakley305 demonstrates this principle. In McCullen, the Court 
found that a Massachusetts statute establishing a thirty-five-foot 
buffer zone around the entrances and driveways of reproductive 
health service facilities was content neutral, but not narrowly 
tailored and thus failed intermediate scrutiny.306 At every point 
prior to McCullen’s reaching the Court, however, the lower courts 
held that ample alternative channels existed for individuals 
                                                                                                     
 302. Id. at 629; see also United States v. Weslin, 156 F.3d 292, 298 (2d Cir. 
1998) (per curiam) (finding the federal Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act 
constitutional because protestors are still “at liberty to hold signs, pass out 
handbills, speak conversationally, and so forth”); American Life League, Inc. v. 
Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 652 (4th Cir. 1995) (1995) (finding the Freedom of Access to 
Clinic Entrances Act leaves open ample alternative means for communication 
because the Act allows individuals to express antiabortion messages in a “non-
violent, non-obstructive manner” via “voice, signs, handbills, symbolic gestures, 
and other expressive means”).   
 303. See Madison Vigil for Life, Inc. v. City of Madison, Wis., 1 F. Supp. 3d 
892, 895 (W.D. Wis. 2014) (analyzing Hill v. Colorado, 500 U.S. 703 (2000)); see 
also McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 657 (3d Cir. 2009) (analyzing 
Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994))). 
 304. See McTernan, 564 F.3d at 657 (citing Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of 
W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997); Madsen v. Women’s Health Cntr., Inc., 512 
U.S. 753, 770 (1994) (holding that a thirty-six-foot buffer zone around the clinic 
entrances burdens no more speech than necessary to accomplish the 
governmental interest at stake); McGuire v. Reilly, 260 F.3d 36, 49 (1st Cir. 2001) 
(upholding a six-foot floating buffer zone). 
 305. 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014). 
 306. See id. at 2523 (explaining that even though the Act is content neutral, 
it is not narrowly tailored because it burdens more speech than necessary to 
further the legitimate interests of the government). 
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seeking to engage in face-to-face counseling of women entering 
those facilities.307 The Court itself purported not to reach the ample 
alternatives issue.308 But its tailoring analysis focused closely on 
the petitioners’ preferred mode of communication, how the 
Massachusetts statute severely hampered that mode, and how 
alternatives to that mode proffered by the state in support of its 
restriction failed to cure the alleged First Amendment violation:  
[At each of the] Planned Parenthood clinics where petitioners 
attempt to counsel patients, the zones carve out a significant 
portion of the adjacent public sidewalks, pushing petitioners 
well back from the clinics’ entrances and driveways. The zones 
thereby compromise petitioners’ ability to initiate the close, 
personal conversations that they view as essential to “sidewalk 
counseling.309 
These cases raise important and sensitive issues regarding the 
conflict between the exercise of two fundamental constitutional 
rights.310 But ample alternative channels analysis is no way to 
decide them. The first question the pre-McCullen cases raise is 
whether we want First Amendment rights to be defined via the 
application of a judicial yardstick. If a one-hundred-foot buffer 
zone is deemed to have not foreclosed alternative means of 
                                                                                                     
 307. See McCullen v. Coakley, 844 F. Supp. 2d 206, 217, 224 (D. Mass. 2012), 
aff’d, 708 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013) (analyzing the statute as applied to clinics in 
Boston, Worcester, and Springfield, and finding ample alternatives existed in all 
three cases); McCullen v. Coakley, 573 F. Supp. 2d 382, 413 (D. Mass. 2008), aff’d, 
571 F.3d 167 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding the statute left ample alternative means in 
response to a facial challenge because most expressive activity can be seen and 
heard by people entering and exiting the buffer zone); McCullen v. Coakley, 571 
F.3d 167, 180 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding protestors could “speak, gesticulate, wear 
screen-printed T-shirts, display signs, use loudspeakers, and engage in the whole 
gamut of lawful expressive activities,” and thus ample alternatives to the buffer 
zone were available). 
 308. See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2540 n.9 (2014) (“Because we 
find that the Act is not narrowly tailored, we need not consider whether the Act 
leaves open ample alternative channels of communication.”) 
 309. Id. at 2535; see also id. at 2536 (noting that because of the difficulty 
petitioners encounter identifying patients before the patients enter the buffer 
zone, petitioners “often cannot approach them in time to place literature near 
their hands—the most effective means of getting the patients to accept it”). 
 310. See, e.g., Leading Case: McCullen v. Coakley, 128 HARV. L. REV. 221, 228–
30 (2014) (arguing that the Court should analyze abortion protest restriction 
cases by balancing protestors’ right to free speech against women’s constitutional 
right to seek abortions at the place of protest). 
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communication for the barred protestor, for example, it is certain 
that the fifty-foot zone in the next case will survive.311 Moreover, 
the Court’s disposition in McCullen recognizes that a speaker’s 
preferred mode of expression deserves meaningful First 
Amendment protections.312 While purporting not to reach ample 
alternative channels, the Court flatly rejected the lower courts’ 
consistent findings that substitutable alternatives existed for these 
speakers despite the restrictions in question: 
Respondents also emphasize that the Act does not prevent 
petitioners from engaging in various forms of “protest”—such as 
chanting slogans and displaying signs—outside the buffer 
zones. That misses the point. Petitioners are not protestors. 
They seek not merely to express their opposition to abortion, but 
to inform women of various alternatives and to provide help in 
pursuing them. Petitioners believe that they can accomplish 
this objective only through personal, caring, consensual 
conversations. And for good reason: It is easier to ignore a 
strained voice or a waving hand than an outstretched arm.313  
A results-oriented view of the Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence might well conclude that McCullen is an abortion 
speech case, that the Court treats abortion speech differently, and 
that McCullen’s reach will thus be limited to those kinds of 
cases.314 As we saw above, most First Amendment scholars view 
the secondary effects doctrine as limited to its subject matter. But 
another reading of the case reveals skepticism of, if not hostility to, 
deciding First Amendment cases on ample alternative channels 
arguments so readily, particularly when such alternatives are, by 
the restricted speaker’s lights and to use the Chief Justice’s word, 
irrelevant to the speaker’s communicative intent.315  
                                                                                                     
 311. See McGuire v. Reilly, 260 F.3d 36, 39 (1st Cir. 2001) (applying Hill to 
find that if the one-hundred-foot buffer and eight-foot bubble zone in Hill left open 
ample alternative means, then an eighteen-foot buffer and six-foot bubble zone 
indisputably did as well).  
 312. See id. at 43 (discussing judicial review standards of First Amendment 
complaints). 
 313. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2536. 
 314. See id. at 2541 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“There is an entirely separate, 
abridged edition of the First Amendment applicable to speech against abortion.”). 
 315. See, e.g., id. at 2524 (“The Commonwealth has not shown that it seriously 
undertook to address these various problems with less intrusive tools readily 
available to it.”). 
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By favoring the mode of communication that the speakers 
themselves “view[ed] as essential” in its narrow tailoring analysis, 
and in giving that choice of mode significant weight in assessing 
whether the restriction at issue burdened the speakers’ expressive 
rights, the Court in McCullen took a first step toward diminishing 
the power of ample alternative channels analysis. 316 It should take 
the next step in that direction and abolish the inquiry from its 
review of content-neutral laws. 
C. Conflicts to Come: Online Speech 
With the emergence of technology-enabled communication, we 
can expect the harms associated with alternative channels 
analysis to increase. As new methods of communication continue 
to develop, alternatives to the speaker’s choice of communicative 
mode will continue multiplying. Their existence tips First 
Amendment analysis in content-neutral cases in the government’s 
favor.317  
There is little doubt that online connectivity has expanded the 
communicative opportunities and audience reach of nearly every 
speaker.318 For present purposes, the substitute avenues for 
speakers that ample alternative channels analysis renders 
dispositive have increased exponentially.319 Following the court 
decisions discussed in Part III.B.1 supra that have found 
opportunities to communicate via television and radio were ample 
alternatives to face-to-face protest activity, governments are 
already relying on this argument in defending regulations against 
First Amendment challenges.320 In last Term’s Reed v. Town of 
                                                                                                     
 316. See id. at 2535 (noting that because of the buffer zone, one speaker 
claimed she had to “rais[e] her voice at patients from outside the zone—a mode of 
communication sharply at odds with the compassionate message she wishes to 
convey”).   
 317. See, e.g., Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(finding that the district court did not err in its First Amendment analysis 
because means of communication existed through the internet and television).  
 318. See id. (indicating that the speaker possessed an alternative for 
communication through the internet). 
 319. See id. (“At a high-profile event . . . messages have a propensity to reach 
delegates through television, radio, the press, the internet, and other outlets.”). 
 320. See id. (“[W]e think that the appellant’s argument greatly 
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Gilbert,321 discussed in more detail infra, the town of Gilbert 
adopted a complicated and comprehensive regime regulating the 
size and duration of signs that could be displayed within the city 
limits.322 In defending its ordinance under intermediate scrutiny, 
the Town argued that the church whose speech was abridged could 
have, and indeed did, express its views in an unfettered fashion in 
a range of other ways not implicated by the ordinance’s 
restrictions, arguing that the petitioners “have utilized a whole 
host of avenues to spread the word about their mission and 
location, including the internet, print advertising, personal 
solicitations, pamphlets, telephone calls, and emails.”323 The Ninth 
Circuit accepted this reasoning before the case reached the 
Supreme Court.324 
The problems raised by this convergence of doctrine and 
technological change are obvious and sobering. In 2016, it is 
difficult to conceive of a case where a content-neutral restriction 
on speech could not be defended on the ground the restricted 
speaker could “spread the word” through “the internet . . . and 
emails.”325 Digital connectivity has removed spatial and temporal 
limitations on communication, but in a First Amendment world 
where the availability of alternative channels is dispositive, it has 
also expanded the government’s ability to restrict speech through 
the use of content-neutral restrictions, because that connectivity 
provides every speaker with alternative modes of communication 
to those the speaker chose.  
The advent of online speech spaces has compounded the 
alternative ways by which practically any speech could be shared 
and accessed, and has correspondingly compounded the problem 
                                                                                                     
underestimates the nature of modern communication.”). 
 321. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (overruling Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 707 F.3d 1057 
(9th Cir. 2013)). 
 322. See id. at 2224 (“The Sign Code identifies various categories of signs 
based on the type of information they convey then subjects each category to 
different restrictions.”). 
 323. Brief for Respondents at 52–53, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 
(2014) (No. 13-502) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents]. 
 324. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 707 F.3d 1057, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2013), 
overruled by Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (noting that the 
ordinance “does not regulate any of the many other ways in which” the church 
could engage in its intended speech).  
 325. Brief for Respondents, supra note 323, at 52. 
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that ample alternative channels analysis presents. It is now 
literally impossible for a ban on one venue for speech to operate as 
a complete ban on the speech in which that venue was to be 
expressed. Accordingly, in the context of content-neutral 
restrictions, the emergence of the Internet, ironically enough, will 
result in the systematic underproduction of speech. 
D. The Content Based vs. Content-Neutral Fallacy 
Let’s back up for a moment. In its First Amendment cases, the 
Supreme Court has long adhered to a distinction between 
“restrictions that turn on the content of expression,” which “are 
subjected to a strict form of judicial review,” and restrictions that 
are “concerned with matters other than content,” which “receive 
more limited examination.”326 As this Article details, this “more 
limited examination” considers the availability of alternative 
channels of communication for the abridged speech in question.327 
This Section considers why First Amendment doctrine has tied 
these two inquiries so closely together. 
Ample alternative channels analysis and the justifications for 
a lesser standard of review for content-neutral restrictions work 
hand-in-hand. The very existence of alternative channels of 
communication supports the conclusion that the content 
restricting law in question is content-neutral.328 As noted above, 
because a content-neutral regulation’s effects are deemed by a 
reviewing court to infringe upon, at most, a means or locus of 
expression and not the expression’s content, the speaker restricted 
by such a regulation is free to shift to another means or locus to 
express the same message.329 Accordingly, the alternatives 
demonstrate that the law is not aimed at the content of the 
speaker’s message and that content remains able to reach its 
                                                                                                     
 326. Redish, The Content Distinction, supra note 157, at 113. 
 327. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
 328. See id. at 144 n.186 (“[T]he more alternative avenues of expression that 
are available, the less justification the state must provide for restricting 
expression.”). 
 329. See id. at 116 (“The reason that [content-neutral restrictions] are 
generally unobjectionable is that they presume the existence of alternative 
avenues of expression, alternatives that are by definition unavailable in the case 
of absolute regulation.”). 
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intended listeners and contribute to public debate.330 Ample 
alternative means analysis can thus be justified as an additional 
way to smoke out whether the restriction in question is truly 
content-neutral—if other ways to communicate the same message 
are available, then the reviewing court can comfortably conclude 
that the facially neutral restriction is not intended to restrict the 
message, but rather its mode.331 Or so the theory goes, anyway.  
But even if it makes sense, why is this inquiry irrelevant to 
the analysis of content-based restrictions? Most content-based 
restrictions (as opposed to apocryphal ones spoken of only in law 
school classes and law review articles, such as “speech about 
politics is banned”332) do not bar alternative channels of 
communication either. As then-Professor Elena Kagan noted, even 
a content-based restriction might make “the danger of distortion 
insignificant” if it affects a “small quantity of speech” and leaves 
“alternative means to communicate the ‘handicapped’ idea” readily 
available to speakers.333 Yet under current law, the availability of 
those alternative channels is irrelevant to a reviewing court once 
a particular regulation is deemed content-based.334 Scrutiny here 
is strict.335 Accordingly, the government’s burden is to justify the 
                                                                                                     
 330. See Quadres, Content-Neutral Public Forum Regulations, supra note 40, 
at 480 (“[I]f one could argue that, despite the questioned regulation, a speaker 
still has numerous alternative means by which to disseminate his message, the 
degree of first amendment injury may seem insubstantial . . . . [because] [t]he 
speaker can always make use of his alternative access.”). 
 331. This interpretation may support the conclusion that ample alternative 
channels is simply a gloss on narrow tailoring analysis. But the two concepts are 
distinct: tailoring analysis involves the government’s alternatives, while 
alternative channels analysis focuses on the speaker’s alternatives. See Williams, 
supra note 149, at 642 (stating that the requirement of alternatives “exists 
because the Court believes that if adequate alternative channels of 
communication remain, then a regulation restricting a particular alternative will 
have no more than a minimal effect on speech.”). 
 332. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 133, at 793 (describing the hypothetical 
arrest of an author for criticizing the President pursuant to a statute that 
criminalizes such critiques). 
 333. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental 
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 446 (1996). 
 334. See id. at 446–47 (commenting that despite the fact that some content-
based restrictions have very minimal effect on skewing public discourse, First 
Amendment doctrine does not distinguish “between content based laws of this 
kind and [those] that wholly excise ideas from public discourse”). 
 335. See id. at 443–44 (“Content-based restrictions on speech-restrictions that 
by their terms limit expression on the basis of what is said usually are subject to 
1726 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1657 (2016) 
level to which its interest in the restriction is compelling.336 
Government arguments that a speaker’s message is not limited to 
the mode of expression that the regulation bars, and that the 
regulation’s harm to speech is thus minimal, are not a part of the 
decision-making calculus for content-based laws.337 
According to the relevant scholarship, the reason this is so is 
that a law’s content-based nature is sufficient indicia standing 
alone of improper governmental motivation.338 In other words, 
content-based restrictions are suspect enough on their face that 
there is no need for any further smoking out of government 
intent.339 But even in the content-based context, the availability of 
different modes to express the same content remains relevant, 
particularly when a content-based law is aimed at a particular 
mode of expression.340 A law that says “no draft card burning in 
protest of the Vietnam War” says nothing about burning President 
Johnson in effigy for the same reason. Can such a law safely be 
deemed as aimed at protesting the Vietnam War and not at draft 
card burning, merely by dint of its reference to content? The law’s 
singling out of a particular mode of expression might lead one to 
conclude that the law is not aimed at, or primarily concerned with, 
restricting public debate, and thus a lesser standard of review 
might be appropriate.341 But once the law makes reference to 
content, the level of scrutiny is decided.342  
                                                                                                     
far more rigorous scrutiny.”). 
 336. See id. at 444 (“Formulations of the standard used to review content-
based action vary, but the Court most often requires the government to show a 
compelling interest that could not be attained through less restrictive means.”). 
 337. Id. at 445. 
 338. See id. at 414 (“First Amendment law, as developed by the Supreme 
Court over the past several decades, has as its primary, though unstated, object 
the discovery of improper governmental motives. The doctrine comprises a series 
of tools to flush out illicit motives and to invalidate actions infected with them.”). 
 339. See id. at 452 n.104 (“[T]he face of a law indicates more reliably than the 
effects of the law what purposes underlie it.”). 
 340. See id. at 418 (concluding that a content-based ordinance, “while not 
restricting a great deal of speech, thus restricted speech in a way that skewed 
public debate on an issue by limiting the expressive opportunities of one side 
only.”). 
 341. See id. at 455 n.110 (stating that, “as the effect of a law on expressive 
opportunities increases, so too should the government's burden of justification” 
and thus, the standard of review used). 
 342. See id. at 499 n.237 (“To merit a stricter standard of review, a law would 
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If there is a place for alternative means analysis in First 
Amendment doctrine at all, it should, as a matter of logic, apply to 
both content-based and content-neutral restrictions. Nothing in 
the distinction between content-based and content-neutral 
restrictions calls for application of alternative channels analysis in 
the latter set of cases but not the former.343 Martin Redish offers 
one path, which he proposes should be applied in any case 
involving regulations that adversely affect expression.344 In such a 
case, a reviewing court should “balance the compellingness of the 
state interest served by the law against the availability of 
alternative means of expression to the speaker.”345 The less likely 
it is “that the speaker will be able to find acceptable alternative 
methods of expression,” Redish continues, “the more compelling 
must be the government’s asserted justification.”346 
As argued above, a primary flaw of ample alternative channels 
analysis is that it favors judge-made alternative modes of 
communication to those the speaker herself chose.347 One could 
critique Redish’s proposal for significantly expanding the role 
these alternatives would play by extending them to content-based 
cases.348 But ample alternative channels analysis’s selective 
application should trigger a critical reexamination of the doctrine, 
the work it is intended to perform, and its effects. Redish’s 
proposed test at least acknowledges the logical fact that 
                                                                                                     
need to have a justification relating not to the restriction of speech generally 
(which all content-neutral laws have), but to the restriction of speech of a certain 
content.”). 
 343. See Redish, The Content Distinction, supra note 157, at 129 
(“[R]egulations that limit expression on content-neutral grounds should logically 
be as suspect as content-based regulations, since they may also undermine this 
value.”). 
 344. See id. at 143 (suggesting that, like content-based inquiries by the court, 
content-neutral inquiries also consider whether the government interests served 
by the restriction are “compelling” enough to “justify significant invasions of free 
speech interests.”). 
 345. Id. at 143; cf. Volokh, supra note 26, at 1307 (rejecting the application of 
ample alternative means to content-based restrictions because of inconsistencies 
in its application in content-neutral cases). 
 346. Redish, The Content Distinction, supra note 157, at 143. 
 347. Supra Part III.A. 
 348. See Volokh, supra note 26, at 1309–10 (criticizing the dangers of applying 
the “vague ample alternative channels” analysis to content-based speech 
restrictions). 
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alternative channels are relevant to either both kinds of cases or 
neither kind.349  
The latter course is the better one. The availability of 
alternative channels of communication may indeed be as relevant 
to content-based restrictions as to content-neutral ones.350 But the 
better conclusion is that considering such channels in the context 
of reviewing any restriction on speech, especially facially neutral 
ones, undermines longstanding rationales for the First 
Amendment.351 Courts should thus no longer consider them. But 
what should courts consider in their place? 
IV. The Solution: Incompatibility 
The foregoing has argued that First Amendment doctrine 
should focus solely on the speaker’s preferred mode of speech and 
the government restriction’s abridgement upon it, to the exclusion 
of other hypothetical speech modes that the speaker has not used. 
One way to achieve this goal is to apply an incompatibility test: 
when a speaker’s expression is infringed by a law or regulation, a 
reviewing court should ask whether the infringed speech act—in 
the form the speaker intended to express it—is incompatible with 
the law and its purpose. The law will survive as applied to the 
speaker only if the speaker’s mode is incompatible with the 
governmental interests asserted in the law’s support.  
                                                                                                     
 349. See Redish, The Content Distinction, supra note 157, at 83 (“Whatever 
rationale one adopts for the constitutional protection of speech, the goals behind 
that rationale are undermined by any limitation on expression, content-based or 
not.”). 
 350. See id. (noting that the proposed framework for evaluating the 
constitutionality of “impaired speech” should include “whether ‘feasible’ less 
restrictive alternatives are inadequate to accomplish that end; and whether the 
speaker will have available adequate means to express the same views to roughly 
the same audience.”). 
 351. But see id. (“Since the Court uses [this test] in reviewing content-based 
regulations, it should have no greater difficulty in applying them to all 
regulations of expression.”). 
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A. The Test 
The concept of incompatibility is no stranger to First 
Amendment doctrine. The Court’s initial foray into reviewing time, 
place, and manner restrictions, 1972’s Grayned v. City of 
Rockford,352 proposed an incompatibility test as the standard to be 
applied to content-neutral laws that adversely affected speech.353 
In Grayned, the speaker was convicted for protesting outside of a 
high school regarding the school’s differential treatment of Black 
students and prospective teachers.354 The school claimed that the 
speaker and his fellow protestors’ activities disrupted classes and 
caused other students to be tardy.355 The anti-noise ordinance that 
the speaker was arrested for violating made it unlawful to “make 
any noise or diversion” adjacent to a school in session “which 
disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order” of that 
school.356  
In reviewing the ordinance, the Court held that “the nature of 
a place, the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of 
regulations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable.”357 
“The crucial question,” the Court concluded, “is whether the 
manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal 
activity of a particular place at a particular time.”358 Further, even 
if the restriction in question is content-neutral on its face, a 
reviewing court should “weigh heavily the fact that communication 
is involved,” and the speech-suppressing regulation “must be 
narrowly tailored to further the state’s legitimate interest.”359  
                                                                                                     
 352. 408 U.S. 104 (1972). 
 353. See id. at 120 (determining that the plaintiff’s noisy demonstrations were 
disruptive and “incompatible with normal school activities” and thus, “may be 
prohibited next to a school when classes are in session.”). 
 354. Id. at 105. 
 355. See id. (reporting that “the demonstrators repeatedly cheered, chanted, 
baited policemen, and made other noise that was audible in the school; that 
hundreds of students were distracted from their school activities”). 
 356. Id. at 107–08. 
 357. Id. at 116 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 358. Id.  
 359. Id. at 116–17. The Court in Grayned held that the ordinance survived 
incompatibility analysis because it “punishe[d] only conduct which disrupts or is 
about to disrupt normal school activities,” as determined based on “an individual 
basis, given the particular fact situation.” Id. at 119. 
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First Amendment law is also familiar with incompatibility 
because of the concept’s use in forum doctrine. Forum doctrine is 
often interpreted to allow governments to bar speech-related uses 
of public property that are incompatible with the property’s 
intended use.360 Incompatibility analysis in forum doctrine cases 
focuses on whether there is physical incompatibility between the 
intended mode of expression and the government’s intended use of 
the property. For instance, in International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,361 the Supreme Court framed the issue 
as whether in-person solicitation of travelers was incompatible 
with the purpose of an airport terminal, which is to ensure those 
travelers can timely reach their flight gates.362  
What is called for here is more searching. Prima facie 
incompatibility of the type discussed in public forum cases—what, 
in application in Lee, amounted to mere inconsistency, which 
sounds in rationality review363—should be insufficient for the 
speech-restricting regulation to survive. Rather, the burden should 
be on the government to show that its interests cannot be met if 
the expression infringed by the restriction were permitted.364 
Inconvenience to the government or its purposes in passing a law 
should never be sufficient in such a case. And a prior use of the 
same government property or other resource for expressive 
purposes that occurred without incident, as was the case in 
                                                                                                     
 360. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 
800 (1985) (“Because a principal purpose of traditional public fora is the free 
exchange of ideas, speakers can be excluded from a public forum only when the 
exclusion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is 
narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.”); see also Int’l Soc’y for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 698 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If 
the objective, physical characteristics of the property at issue and the actual 
public access and uses which have been permitted by the government indicate 
that expressive activity would be appropriate and compatible with those uses, the 
property is a public forum.”). 
 361. 505 U.S. 672, 698 (1992). 
 362. See id. at 682–83 (describing the traditional use and expectations of 
airport terminals). 
 363. See id. at 682 (stating that the appellants’ expressions in the airport were 
inconsistent with the forum’s purpose because “terminals have never been 
dedicated to expression in the form sought to be exercised here: i.e., the 
solicitation of contributions and the distribution of literature”). 
 364. See id. at 679 (stating that “the government has a high burden in 
justifying speech restrictions relating to traditional public fora”). 
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Clark,365 would cut the incompatibility analysis in the speaker’s 
favor. In sum, a default rule of the type incompatibility analysis 
would impose would return a speaker-favoring presumption to the 
Court’s First Amendment cases—a presumption to which the 
Court’s historical First Amendment cases express sympathy for.366  
There is no denying that content-neutrality doctrine serves an 
important overarching purpose: to ensure that there is no 
freestanding speech-related defense to laws of general 
applicability. But incompatibility analysis would not stand in the 
way of most generally applicable laws aimed at criminal conduct. 
It would not, for example, undermine the longstanding rule that 
the First Amendment does not protect speech facilitating illegal 
activity.367 A piece of false advertising is incompatible with the 
government’s compelling interest in protecting consumers.368 
Similarly, a Craigslist ad that solicits prostitution or offers to sell 
illegal drugs is incompatible with the interest in criminalizing the 
conduct that the barred speech proposes. It would be incompatible 
with the government’s purpose in criminalizing homicide, property 
damage, or the like to permit those crimes on the claim the conduct 
underlying the violation was expressive. Where a law is clearly 
aimed at an important governmental interest unrelated to 
expression and any claimed harm to the speaker punished under 
the law’s expressive interest is truly de minimis, an 
incompatibility test would not stand in the state’s way every time 
a defendant proffers a First Amendment defense.  
                                                                                                     
 365. See supra notes 158–161 and accompanying text (noting that the 
National Mall had been previously used for “expressive sleeping” purposes prior 
to the Petitioner’s request). 
 366. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529–30 (1945) (suspending 
usual presumption of constitutionality and placing burden of persuasion on 
government where economic legislation adversely affected the “freedoms secured 
by the First Amendment”).  
 367. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (“[I]t 
has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a 
course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, 
evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or 
printed.”). 
 368. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 781 (1976) (“[T]he elimination of false and deceptive claims 
serves to promote the one facet of commercial price and product advertising that 
warrants First Amendment protection its contribution to the flow of accurate and 
reliable information relevant to public and private decision-making.”). 
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An incompatibility analysis of content-neutral restrictions 
would also prove flexible enough to accommodate the parade of 
horribles that many claim would follow if those restrictions were 
to receive greater scrutiny because of their effects on speech.369 
Facially neutral government considerations such as traffic flow 
and safety could justify denials of parade permits, for example, so 
long as the chosen mode of expression and its chosen time and 
place were truly incompatible with the government’s interest in 
denying such requests for uses of public space.370 As Justice 
Marshall wrote when expounding on the incompatibility principle 
in Grayned: 
[T]wo parades cannot march on the same street simultaneously, 
and government may allow only one. A demonstration or parade 
on a large street during rush hour might put an intolerable 
burden on the essential flow of traffic, and for that reason could 
be prohibited. If overamplified loudspeakers assault the 
citizenry, government may turn them down. . . . Although a 
silent vigil may not unduly interfere with a public library, 
making a speech in the reading room almost certainly would.371  
Under the current “substantial government interest” prong of 
the content-neutral intermediate scrutiny standard, courts barely 
scrutinize the substantiality of the government’s asserted interest 
at all.372 Justice Marshall’s Grayned opinion also suggests another 
potential feature of an incompatibility test: the validity of a 
particular law under the test will place sharper focus upon the 
government interest asserted in defense of that law.373 Where a 
                                                                                                     
 369. See Redish, The Content Distinction, supra note 157, at 142 (“Proponents 
of the content distinction [between content-based and content-neural restrictions] 
may be concerned that increasing the level of judicial scrutiny for content-neutral 
restrictions may result in a generally reduced skepticism for all content-based 
classification.”). 
 370. Supra note 353 and accompanying text. 
 371. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117 (1972) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 372. See William E. Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the Supreme 
Court: The Doctrine of Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expression, 54 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 757, 782–84 (1986) [hereinafter Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers] 
(“[M]easuring the substantiality of the government’s interest is not a critical part 
of the Court’s time, place and manner methodology. The Court rarely tells 
legislatures or Congress that their concerns are insubstantial; therefore the 
balance usually will be struck in favor of governmental interests.”). 
 373. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 117.  
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speaker’s First Amendment rights are implicated, courts should 
not assume government interests are substantial simply because 
the laws purportedly supporting those interests were products of 
the legislative process. Speech interests cannot be put to majority 
vote.374 
B. Untying Doctrinal Knots 
An incompatibility test can also solve one of the First 
Amendment’s most bedeviling doctrinal problems. Since the mid-
1980s, the Supreme Court has collapsed the review of time, place, 
and manner regulations, and of regulations infringing symbolic 
speech into a single strand of intermediate scrutiny that includes 
ample alternatives analysis.375 Much harm to speech has 
followed.376 Incompatibility analysis might untie these two lines of 
doctrine.  
Specifically, when characterizing the barred speaker’s chosen 
communicative mode for incompatibility analysis purposes, the 
court might first categorize the mode according to a distinction 
that Susan Williams has drawn as “communicative” versus 
“facilitative.”377 In a symbolic speech case such as United States v. 
                                                                                                     
 374. See Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, supra note 372, at 784 (illustrating that 
scholars have criticized “the minimal scrutiny the Court applies to the 
substantiality of the government's interest,” stating courts have given substantial 
weight to government interests merely because they were “not imaginary” and, 
thus, have failed to honestly “weigh the interest against the impact on freedom of 
expression”). 
  375. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) (“[T]he O’Brien test 
differs little from the standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions”); see 
also Williams, supra note 149, at 619–20 (“The Court, arguing that the two 
standards were always functionally identical, has melded them into one test.” 
(citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989))); Clark v. Cmty. 
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984) (noting that “the four-factor 
standard of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), for validating a 
regulation of expressive conduct” is “little, if any, different from the standard 
applied to time, place, or manner restrictions”). 
 376. See Williams, supra note 149, at 620 (“Although the two separate lines 
of doctrine were far from robust even when they were independent, the new 
unified doctrine provides even less protection for speech.”). 
 377. See id. at 660–61 (defining the “communicative” mode as conveying a 
message “through symbols that represent [the] message” and the “facilitative” 
mode as “part of the speech activity which the speaker uses to aid in the 
transmission . . . of the message, but which does not itself play a role in the 
1734 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1657 (2016) 
O’Brien or Clark v. CCNV,378 the mode of expression—burning a 
draft card, sleeping in Lafayette Park, or burning an American 
flag379—the conduct at issue is communicative, as it plays “a role 
in the representation of the message.”380 In many cases, the 
speaker’s choice of mode is itself expressive; upholding the 
restriction in such a case on ample alternatives grounds forces the 
speaker to change her message to something different 
altogether.381 It is in these symbolic speech cases where ample 
alternative channels analysis does the most harm to speech.382  
Alternatively, in a case traditionally characterized as 
involving the time, place, or manner of expression, the choice of 
mode is facilitative of the underlying expression.383 The mode aids 
in the message’s transmission and is intended to expand the 
potential audience for the speech—the use of loudspeakers on a 
sound truck384 or of one’s own PA system rather than the one a host 
provides385—but it is not itself communicative. Here, finding the 
                                                                                                     
representation of the message”). 
 378. 468 U.S. 288 (1984)   
 379. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989). 
 380. Williams, supra note 149, at 661–63.  
 381. See id. at 644 (“In a true symbolic speech case . . . [where] the 
communication takes place through symbolic action––the regulation would have 
to be aimed at . . . non-speech activities, rather than . . . content categories of 
speech, and the government’s purpose would have to be to prevent some non-
communicative harm caused by such activities.”). 
 382. See id. at 654 (“[T]he range of doctrinal tools available to deal with 
complex first amendment problems has been reduced, and real first amendment 
protections have been lost.”). 
 383. See id. at 706 n.330 (“If the physical activity about which the government 
is concerned is expressive, we have a symbolic speech case; if it is facilitative, we 
have a [time, place, or manner] case.”). 
 384. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 78 (1949) (examining the 
constitutionality of an ordinance that made it unlawful to use a sound truck for 
“advertising purposes, or for any other purpose whatsoever, on or upon the public 
streets, alleys or thoroughfares”). 
  385. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784 (1989) 
This case arises from the city’s attempt to regulate the volume of 
amplified music at [an amphitheater] so the performances are 
satisfactory to the audience without intruding upon those who [reside] 
in its vicinity. The city’s regulation requires [amphitheater] performers 
to use sound-amplification equipment and a sound technician provided 
by the city. 
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speaker could have used an alternative mode may do less harm to 
the speaker’s expressive right.  
And a third kind of case, not delineated by Williams but highly 
relevant, involves government infringements of the speaker’s 
choices of how, when, and where to speak that do not constitute 
symbolic speech, but nevertheless go to the core of the expressive 
act to a much greater degree than in the run-of-the-mill time, 
place, or manner restriction on facilitative conduct. Here, recall the 
kinds of cases discussed in Parts III.B.1. and B.4. supra: public 
protests at specific events intended for specific audiences, of the 
type discussed in the Menotti386 and Bl(a)ck Tea Society387 cases, or 
on-site abortion counseling of the type discussed in McCullen.388 
We might call these cases “associative conduct” cases, because 
though they do not involve symbolic speech, the relevant speech’s 
intended message and effects, along with its particular audience, 
are inextricably associated with the message’s mode, time, and 
place—so much so that communicative content can be ascribed to 
the speech-accompanying conduct.  
Incompatibility analysis could take into account these three 
categories by granting greater or less deference to the speaker’s 
choice of expressive mode depending on where along the 
communicative-associative-facilitative continuum the mode falls. 
In other words, a presumption in favor of the speaker could be 
applied where the conduct in question is communicative or 
associative prior to determining whether permitting the mode 
would be incompatible with the government interest at issue. The 
more communicative a speaker’s choice of mode, the more likely 
the content-neutral restriction that has infringed upon that mode 
will be found to have violated the speaker’s First Amendment 
right. 
Adopting incompatibility analysis can encourage courts to 
closely analyze the role that speech-accompanying conduct plays 
in a speaker’s expressive act. Under current doctrine, it is a court’s 
characterization of a particular law as content-based or content-
                                                                                                     
 386. Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 387. Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 388. McCullen v. Coakley, 844 F. Supp. 2d 206 (D. Mass. 2012). 
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neutral, not the speaker’s intent, which decides the answer to that 
question.389  
C. Incompatibility and Underinclusivity in the Review of Content-
Neutral Laws 
Another important doctrinal advance that incompatibility 
analysis would accomplish is to place underinclusivity in the 
foreground when analyzing content-neutral speech restrictions. 
Despite the fact that scrutiny of such restrictions is nominally 
rigorous, courts have failed to take underinclusivity seriously in 
analyzing content-neutral laws.390 First Amendment review of sign 
regulations offer a good example.  
Municipalities justify signage restrictions based on 
government interests in traffic safety and aesthetics.391 The local 
ordinance at issue in the abovementioned Reed facially 
distinguished between signs based on the message that those signs 
conveyed and was thus, as the Supreme Court eventually found, 
clearly content-based; in effect, the size of a sign or the length of 
time a sign could be shown depended on what that sign said.392 As 
noted above, the Town of Gilbert had argued to the Supreme Court, 
consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s holding in its favor, that its 
ordinance was content-neutral; in offering the government 
interests supporting the ordinance, the Town claimed that it 
                                                                                                     
  389. See Redish, The Content Distinction, supra note 157, at 121–27 
(discussing the development of the content-based and content-neutral distinction 
within the Supreme Court). 
 390. See Harnish v. Manatee County, 783 F.2d 1535, 1539 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(finding that bans on portable signs that were justified for aesthetic reasons were 
not fatally underinclusive, even though such signs “represent[ed] a small fraction 
of the total number of sign advertisements” in those cities); Mark Cordes, Sign 
Regulation After Ladue: Examining the Evolving Limits of First Amendment 
Protection, 74 NEB. L. REV. 36, 67 (1995) (“Potential problems arise, however, with 
regard to content-neutral restrictions which prohibit or more severely restrict 
particular types of signs within the same area, thus posing underinclusiveness 
concerns.”). 
 391. See Cordes, supra note 390, at 1 (recognizing one primary concern of 
municipal efforts to regulate signs and billboards to be “supporting regulation, 
most notably traffic safety and aesthetics”). 
 392. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (finding the 
town ordinance “content based on its face”).  
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“serve[d] to minimize visual clutter and confusion for people 
traveling to an event that has already concluded.”393  
The Town’s arguments as to the relationship between these 
two asserted state interests and the means taken to further them, 
while claiming to apply intermediate scrutiny to its own ordinance, 
sound more in rationality review. As discussed supra, content-
neutral intermediate scrutiny is, in effect, rational basis review, 
and those arguments thus would likely have been sufficient to 
uphold the Town’s restrictions if the Ninth Circuit had deemed the 
ordinance content-neutral.394 However, the interests in preserving 
such “visual clutter” or in protecting “confuse[d] travelers”395 would 
not survive incompatibility analysis. As to the “visual clutter”-
related interest, the permissibility of a range of other signs—
political signs (the display of which had to be allowed under state 
law), or signs that the Town called “Ideological Signs,” whose use 
was much less restricted under its ordinance—shows that the 
ordinance’s limits on a particular subset of signs is drastically 
underinclusive.396 And as to the “confused traveler”-related 
interest,397 travelers can be confused for a range of reasons, the 
overwhelming majority of which have nothing to do with a local 
church sign promoting an event in that community that has 
already passed. In both cases, the underinclusivity of the 
ordinance demonstrates that the restricted speech at issue is not 
                                                                                                     
 393. Brief for Respondents, supra note 323, at 4. The Court’s cases have 
expressed sympathy for such arguments. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker 
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (plurality opinion) (explaining that “[w]here a 
city consciously has limited access to its transit system advertising space in order 
to minimize chances of abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the risk of 
imposing upon a captive audience, these are reasonable” restrictions and there is 
no constitutional violation); id. at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“In my view the 
right of the commuters to be free from forced intrusions on their privacy precludes 
the city from transforming its vehicles of public transportation into forums for the 
dissemination of ideas upon this captive audience.”). 
 394. See supra Part III.A (discussing self-autonomy theory and the 
marketplace). 
 395. Brief for Respondents, supra note 323, at 48.  
 396. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 707 F.3d 057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Section 
4.402(D) lists nineteen different types of signs that are allowed without a permit. 
Three of the types of exempted signs are of particular relevance: ‘Temporary 
Directional Signs Relating to Qualifying Event,’ ‘Political Signs,’ and ‘Ideological 
Signs.’”). 
 397. Brief for Respondents, supra note 323, at 48. 
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incompatible with the relevant state interests, and the ordinance 
should fail.  
By focusing on the potential underinclusivity of government 
action suppressing speech, incompatibility analysis will force the 
government to act much more narrowly when burdening speech 
through content-neutral restrictions. For instance, while a 
generalized interest in aesthetics and visual clutter will often be 
insufficient to demonstrate sufficient incompatibility for a law to 
survive First Amendment scrutiny, preservation of a particular 
area’s historic or aesthetic character might be.398 While this kind of 
incompatibility-based tailoring may or may not be as demanding as 
the least restrictive means requirement that is applied to content-
based restrictions—a test whose applicability to the content-neutral 
context the Court has rejected399—it will hold the government to its 
obligation to limit as little speech as possible when acting. 
Incompatibility will ensure that the burden of persuasion remains 
on the state to justify even an incidental restriction.400 
V. Conclusion 
In 1939’s Schneider v. State of New Jersey,401 the Supreme 
Court was faced with four challenges to municipal ordinances 
passed by cities in California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and 
Wisconsin.402 These laws prohibited or restricted distributing 
                                                                                                     
 398. See, e.g., Messer v. City of Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505, 1511 (11th Cir. 
1992) (finding a restriction on signs within 300 feet of historic site to be 
permissible). 
 399. See Volokh, supra note 26, at 64 (“While this principle [that the speaker 
chooses his means of communication] generally applies when the law restricts the 
content of speech . . . and thus interferes with the speaker's choice of content, it 
generally doesn't apply when a content-neutral law restricts the manner of 
speech, [interfering] with the speaker's choice of manner.”). 
 400. Cf. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 79–80 (1981) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (“[I]f one starts . . . from the premise that 
appellant’s claims are rooted in the First Amendment, it would seem reasonable 
for the Borough to overcome a presumption of invalidity.”). 
 401. 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
 402. See id. at 153–54 (1939) (“Four cases are here, each of which presents the 
question whether regulations embodied in a municipal ordinance abridge the 
freedom of speech and of the press secured against state invasion by 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.”). 
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handbills or other preprinted material, regardless of the 
distributor’s identity or the handbill’s content.403 In all four cases, 
the convictions for violating the ordinances were affirmed by the 
courts below, which found that the laws struck the proper balance 
between “the right of free expression” and the cities’ power to pass 
“reasonable” regulations supported by the governmental interests 
in preventing “littering of the streets” and “protecting the 
occupants” of homes “from disturbance and annoyance.”404 Two of 
those courts, foreshadowing the dispositive role that alternative 
channels analysis would come to play in First Amendment doctrine, 
upheld the ordinances in question on the ground they excluded only 
“the public streets” from handbill distribution, and “leave[] open for 
such distribution all other places in the city, public and private.”405  
The Supreme Court invalidated all four ordinances.406 After 
noting that all of the ordinances were content-neutral but 
nevertheless burdened free expression,407 the Court took particular 
exception to the claim that the ordinances permitted handbillers to 
distribute their messages in other ways, and that this fact saved the 
laws’ constitutionality.408 The Court proclaimed that “one is not to 
have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places 
abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.”409  
In the fifty years since United States v. O’Brien, the Court has 
abandoned this pronouncement. In its place, the Court has 
                                                                                                     
 403. See id. at 156 (“An ordinance of the City of Worcester, Massachusetts, 
provides: ‘No person shall distribute in, or place upon any street or way, any 
placard, handbill, flyer, poster, advertisement or paper of any description.’”). 
 404. Id. at 165.  
 405. See id. at 157 (quoting the Massachusetts court’s decision upholding the 
Worcester ordinance); see also id. at 163 (referring to the Los Angeles ordinance). 
 406. See id. at 160 (“Although a municipality may enact regulations in the 
interest of the public safety, health, welfare or convenience, these may not abridge 
the individual liberties secured by the Constitution to those who wish to speak, 
write, print or circulate information or opinion.”). 
 407. See id. at 163 (noting that one of the ordinances “bans unlicensed 
communication of any views or the advocacy of any cause”). 
 408. See id. (stating that the streets are an appropriate place to distribute 
printed manner to the public and just because one could theoretically distribute 
those materials elsewhere does not mean that the ordinance is constitutionally 
sound). 
 409. Id.; see also Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 
(1975) (citing Schneider for the very same proposition); Spence v. Washington, 
418 U.S. 405, 411 n.4 (1974) (per curiam) (same). 
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entrenched an approach that permits an entire category of burdens 
on speech-related conduct on the ground that those burdens are 
instrumental rather than substantive. And, in support of this 
approach, it has ratified an inquiry that permits judicially created 
speech norms to override speaker communicative choice—the very 
kind of governmental imposition on expression that the First 
Amendment was designed to protect speakers from.   
A return to Justice Roberts’ Schneider First Amendment 
baseline will likely result in more protestors sleeping in public parks 
to raise awareness about homelessness; more Hare Krishnas 
attempting to hand us leaflets as we stroll along the fairgrounds or 
rush to our airport gates; and more political signs in our public right-
of-ways. These are minor prices, and they are well worth paying for 
a society that is committed to free expression. It also likely means 
that women seeking to exercise their right to choose will be 
confronted by anti-abortion activists who believe that those women 
may be about to make a tremendous mistake,410 or that a candidate 
or her supporter seeking to persuade a voter need not stand back 
one-hundred feet from the entrance of the voter’s polling place.411 
Perhaps some of us might be more equivocal about those prices. But 
again, they are worth paying in a society that is committed not only 
to the individual’s liberty to decide what to say, but also of how one 
may say it.  
It is indeed so that the First Amendment feeds “[h]umanity’s 
innate desire for truth.”412 But the Speech Clause also leaves to each 
of us to choose how to fulfill that desire, and to find that truth. In 
analyzing content-based restrictions on speech, the Supreme Court 
insists that “the First Amendment mandates that we presume that 
speakers, not the government, know best both what they want to 
say and how to say it.”413 By abandoning ample alternative channels 
analysis, the Court can respect that same principle in its review of 
content-neutral laws. 
                                                                                                     
 410. See supra Part III.B.4 (discussing abortion clinic protest cases). 
 411. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 204 (1992) (“New 
York . . . prohibited any person from ‘electioneering on election day within any 
polling-place, or within one hundred feet of any polling place.’”). 
 412. William F. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First 
Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 27 (1995).  
 413. Riley v. Nat’l Fed. of Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 790–91 (1988). 
